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PHYSICIAN DATA BANKS: THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO
KNOW VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Julie Barker Pape*
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, as the health care debate intensified and the number
of medical malpractice suits rose dramatically, questions arose how
best to improve the overall quality of health care.1 Because medicine
is largely a self-regulating profession, one of the best ways to improve
the quality of medical care practiced is to strengthen medical peer re-
view,2 the process by which physicians monitor one another's treat-
ment of patients to determine if staff privileges should be granted or
denied, continued or terminated.3 Unfortunately, in the 1980s, peer
review had been greatly stifled by the large treble damages awarded in
the peer review antitrust lawsuits that became prevalent during that
* The author would like to thank Professors Joel Reidenberg and Benjamin
Zipursky for their helpful information and comments on this Note.
1. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1)
(1994) [hereinafter "HCQIA"] ("The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice
and the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide
problems that warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any indi-
vidual State.").
2. When former Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.) introduced the HCQUIA, he
remarked, "In the long run, doctors themselves are in the best position to put an end
to malpractice .... " Barbara A. Blackmond, Current Issues-The National Practi-
tioner Data Bank and Hospital Peer Review, 7 Health Law. 1, 3 (1993), available in
WESTLAW; see also HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3) ("This nationwide problem can
be remedied through effective professional peer review.").
3. "Peer review is the evaluation and monitoring of the qualifications and skills
of physicians by their colleagues with whom they practice in a particular health care
facility. The purpose of peer review is to monitor the quality, appropriateness and
necessity of the medical care given to patients." Jeanne Darricades, Comment, Medi-
cal Peer Review: How is it Protected by the Health Care Quality Improvenent Act of
1986?, 18 J. Contemp. L. 263, 270 (1992). Peer review is usually conducted when a
physician applies for staff privileges at a new hospital or when a physician's conduct
comes into question. The HCQIA calls peer review "professional review activity"
and defines it as an "activity of a health care entity with respect to an individual
physician-(A) to determine whether the physician may have clinical privileges with
respect to, or membership in, the entity, (B) to determine the scope or conditions of
such privileges or membership, or (C) to change or modify such privileges or mem-
bership." 42 U.S.C. § 11151(10). Because almost every physician seeks staff privileges
at some point in his career, peer review affects the vast majority of physicians.
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time.4 This thinking lead to Congressional efforts to revitalize peer
review.
In an effort to bolster peer review and, consequently, the overall
quality of health care, Oregon Congressional Representative Ron
Wyden (D-Or.) introduced the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
of 1986 (the "HCQIA") on March 12, 1986.6 Based on the assump-
tion that fear of huge antitrust lawsuits was preventing physicians
from adequately reporting and disciplining their negligent colleagues,
the HCQUIA provides qualified antitrust immunity to peer review
boards that follow certain procedures and guidelines.7 To obtain im-
munity, a peer review activity must be undertaken
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of
quality health care, (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts
of the matter, (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved or after such other procedures as
are fair to the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the rea-
sonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known af-
ter such reasonable effort to obtain facts and after meeting the
requirement of paragraph (3). 8
When peer review boards comply with these guidelines, they are im-
mune from federal antitrust lawsuits. 9
4. In the 1980s, many physicians who were denied staff privileges retaliated by
filing lawsuits under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994), which al-
lows a plaintiff whose right to conduct business has been compromised to collect
treble damages. Exemplary of these suits is Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99 (1988),
in which the Supreme Court upheld a two million dollar treble damages award to a
physician who sued for wrongful dismissal by a peer review board. In enacting the
HCQIA, Congress recognized the harmful effect of cases like Patrick on peer review.
See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) ("The threat of private money damage liability
under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, un-
reasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer re-
view."); see also Herbert G. Gleitz, et al., Practical Implications of the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act 13-17 (Roxane C. Busey and Arthur N. Lerner eds., 1994)
(discussing the effect of Patrick on the passage of the HCQIA).
5. See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(5) ("There is an overriding national need to
provide incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer
review."). See generally Blackmond, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the seminal physi-
cian antitrust case, Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988), and the stifling effect it had
on hospital peer review); Darricades, supra note 3, at 271-72 (discussing physician
disincentives for participating in peer review).
6. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1994). President
Reagan signed the bill into law on November 14, 1996. Blackmond, supra note 2, at 3.
7. The HCQIA requires that the peer review process incorporates due process
and that peer review be undertaken only with the purpose of improving the quality of
medicine practiced. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a); see also Ilene D. Johnson, Reports to the
National Practitioner Data Bank, 265 JAMA 407, 407 (1991) (discussing the immunity
requirements of the HCQIA).
8. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a).
9. Id.
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To aid physicians in peer review activities, the HCQIA mandated
the establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank to collect
and disseminate to specified professional review entities disciplinary
and malpractice information. 10 The National Practitioner Data Bank
contains information on malpractice judgments and settlement pay-
ments," disciplinary sanctions, 2 and license suspensions and revoca-
tions.13 It was established to improve peer review by serving as an
information clearinghouse that peer review boards and other medical
authorities could check when evaluating a physician's ability to prac-
tice quality medicine.' 4 Indeed, the HCQIA requires peer review
boards to check the National Practitioner Data Bank when making
credentialing decisions and every two years thereafter.' 5 To improve
physicians' confidence in the peer review process, the HCQIA pro-
vides limited antitrust immunity to those who check the National
Practitioner Data Bank as required.' 6
Information in the National Practitioner Data Bank is confidential
and can only be disclosed to the entities specifically enumerated in the
Data Bank regulations, primarily professional review authorities;' 7 the
general public currently does not have access to any of the informa-
tion in the National Practitioner Data Bank.' a The Office of the In-
spector General of the Department of Health and Human Services
can impose civil monetary sanctions on parties violating these confi-
dentiality provisions."
Although the initial purpose of the National Practitioner Data Bank
was to provide physician information to peer review boards, consumer
10. See Encouraging Good Faith Professional Review Activities, Title IV, Part B,
Pub. L. No. 99-660 (1986); see also 140 Cong. Rec. 141902, available in 1994 WL
141902.
11. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11131.
12. Id. § 11133.
13. Id. § 11132.
14. See id. § 11135.
15. Id. § 11135(a).
16. Id. § 11111(a). The HCQIA also grants immunity to those who provide infor-
mation to peer review boards or the National Practitioner Data Bank. Id.
§ 11111(a)(2).
17. Those authorities include: a hospital requesting information concerning a
medical practitioner on its staff or with privileges at the hospital; Boards of Medical
Examiners or state licensing boards; health care entities who may be entering into an
employment relationship or granting staff privileges to a health care practitioner;, an
attorney who has filed a suit against the hospital based on the hospital's failure to
check the data bank regarding a specific practitioner; a health care entity with respect
to peer review, and a physician accessing his own record. 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a); see
National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and Other
Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60 (1996); see also National Practitioner Data
Bank-- Fact Sheet for the General Public (visited July 3, 1997) <http-/Jvww.npdb.com/
factsheet/fsgenpub.htm> [hereinafter "NPDB Fact Sheet"] (providing general infor-
mation about the National Practitioner Data Bank).
18. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (1994).
19. Id § 11137(b)(2).
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rights activists soon came to view the National Practitioner Data Bank
as a valuable resource for evaluating physicians.2" Public activists,
anxious about what they see as the declining quality of health care,
believe that medical consumers should be able to use the National
Practitioner Data Bank to screen their doctors and, thereby, avoid
negligent ones.2'
Despite numerous efforts by patient rights advocates, however, the
National Practitioner Data Bank has remained inaccessible to the gen-
eral public.2' Not surprisingly, other publicly accessible sources for
this information have emerged. For example, in November 1996, the
state of Massachusetts established its own data bank to provide its
citizens with information about Massachusetts physicians. 2 3 Other
states are currently implementing or plan to implement similar data
banks? 4
The availability of this information has sparked tremendous debate.
Medical consumers and consumer rights groups praise the Massachu-
setts data bank and argue that even more information about physi-
cians and their practice histories should be disclosed to the public.2
5
At the same time, physicians and physician groups, such as the Ameri-
20. See Sidney M. Wolfe, Congress Should Open the National Practitioner Data
Bank to All, Pub. Health Rep., July 1, 1995, at 378 (arguing that medical consumers
should have access to the National Practitioner Data Bank).
21. "People are hungry for this kind of information." Linda Castrone, Charting the
Doctors; You Don't Have to Be a Brain Surgeon to Evaluate Prospects, Rocky Moun-
tain News, Dec. 3, 1996, at 3D, available in 1996 WL 12359268 (quoting Hal Alpiar,
author of Doctor Shopping: How to Choose the Right Doctor for You and Your
Family (Health Information Press)).
22. See supra Part L.A (discussing consumer rights advocates' and Congressional
efforts to publicize the contents of the National Practitioner Data Bank).
23. An Act Providing for Increased Public Access to Data Concerning Physicians,
1996 Mass. Acts ch. 307, § 5 (to be codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 112, § 2 (1997))
[hereinafter Massachusetts Act]. See generally Jeffrey P. Donohue, Developing Issues
Under the Massachusetts "Physician Profile" Act, 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 115 (1997) (dis-
cussing the effects of the Massachusetts Act).
24. For example, several states have Internet-accessible data banks. See Florida
Physicians Directory, (visited December 13, 1997) <http://www.physiciansdirectory.
corn>; Georgia Secretary of State Office, (visited Dec. 13, 1997)
<www.sos.state.ga.us>; Arizona Board of Medical Examiners home page (visited Dec.
13, 1997) <http://www.docboard.orglbomex/index.htm>.
25. See, e.g., Editorial, Our View: Massachusetts is Taking the Mystery out of Doc-
tors' Backgrounds. Other States Should Follow., USA Today, Oct. 31, 1996, at 10A
(praising the Massachusetts data bank and arguing that other states should emulate
it); Editorial, Physician Profiles: Handled Properly, Information Will Aid Consumers,
Telegram & Gazette (Worcester, Mass.), Aug. 29, 1996, at A14, available in 1996 WL
2401559 (discussing the benefits of the Massachusetts data bank); Editorial, Public
Deserves Data on Doctors' Records, The Tennessean, Jan. 4, 1997, at 10A (arguing
that Tennessee should follow Massachusetts and establish a similar physician data
bank); Laurel Shackelford, Patients Need Good Information About Their Doctors,
The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 17, 1996, at 2D (praising the Massachu-
setts data bank and arguing that other states should emulate it).
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can Medical Association (the "AMA"),26 call for the eradication of
such data banks, arguing that the information contained in the data
banks is misleading to medical consumers and violative of physician
privacy rights.27 This Note acknowledges the public's right to access
physician information and make informed risk calculations, yet also
argues that the physician data banks compromise certain physician
privacy interests and that, when physicians are forced to protect their
privacy, they will be less likely to disclose any information at all18-
severely hindering peer review and resulting in a cumulative negative
effect on the quality of health care. 9
This Note discusses the controversy surrounding physician informa-
tion and how the necessary information can be disseminated to medi-
cal consumers without compromising physician privacy and, in turn,
the overall quality of health care. Part I provides background infor-
mation on the National Practitioner Data Bank and other state data
banks containing physician practice information. Part II discusses the
public policy debate surrounding whether the information contained
in these data banks should be made available to the general public
and, if so, in what form and amount. Part III analyzes the privacy
issues involved in this controversy by chronicling the concept of pri-
vacy as it has evolved in American common and statutory law, identi-
fying physicians' existing legal interest in this information and
discussing the unique privacy issues that must be considered when the
information at issue is contained in an electronic data bank format.
Part II also introduces "fair information practices," standards that
have been formulated to maintain an electronic data bank in compli-
ance with the privacy considerations established earlier in Part III.
Part III determines that, because of the public's strong interest in re-
ceiving information about their doctors, physicians' privacy interests
are best protected not by a right to withhold information, but by a
right to ensure that information about them is collected and dissemi-
nated legitimately and responsibly. Therefore, part IV provides an
ideal model for a federal physician data bank that provides medical
consumers the information they need to make informed choices about
26. See Brenda C. Coleman, Doctors on the Examination Table The AMA at 150:
Whom Is It Looking Out For?, Star-Tribune (Minneapolis-St. Paul), June 27, 1997, at
15A, available in 1997 WL 7571882 (providing a general background description and
critique of the AMA's activities).
27. Carol Ann Campbell, States Trying to Remedy Abuses Curing Doctors Meas-
ures Would Reduce Secrecy, Add Scrutiny, The Record (Northern New Jersey), Dec.
20, 1994, at A01, available in 1994 WL 7794549; Della De Lafuente, Consumer Cri-
tique: AMA Scoffs at "Dubious Doctors" List, Chicago Sun-Times, March 29, 1996, at
39.
28. Dolores Kong, A Doctor's Past: Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, The
Boston Globe, Nov. 28 1994, at 25 (discussing how, if doctors do not support making
the information public, they will resist supplying the necessary information).
29. See supra note 2 (discussing the importance of peer review in quality health
care).
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their health care, but does not unnecessarily compromise physician
privacy interests. Part IV argues that providing limited access to the
National Practitioner Data Bank in accordance with "fair information
practices" would best accomplish these objectives. Part IV first dis-
cusses the differences in privacy protection between the various states
and between the states and the federal government, and concludes
that, because of federal privacy laws already in place, a federal data
bank has greater potential for incorporating fair information practices.
Part IV then analyzes the application of fair information practices to
the National Practitioner Data Bank and indicates which information
should be disseminated and with what limitations and restrictions so
as to allow limited public access with only minimal infringement of
physician privacy interests.
I. PHYSICIAN INFORMATION DATA BANKS AND THE
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THEIR ACCESSIBILITY BY
THE PUBLIC
This part provides an overview of the National Practitioner Data
Bank, the Massachusetts physician data bank, and other state data
banks. This part first examines the functions and operations of the
National Practitioner Data Bank and discusses the decision to main-
tain the confidentiality of its files. This part then discusses the Massa-
chusetts and other state data banks that have been or will be created
to give consumers access to physician information withheld from them
by the National Practitioner Data Bank.
A. The National Practitioner Data Bank
The National Practitioner Data Bank, which was established as part
of the HCQIA, is maintained by the Department of Health and
Human Services and serves as a repository of physician information.3
The regulations established for the National Practitioner Data Bank
require reporting of the following situations: any payment made by
any individual or entity on behalf of a physician for the purposes of
settlement, partial settlement, or to satisfy a malpractice claim, and
any adverse licensing or disciplinary actions taken against a physi-
cian.31 Entities that are required to report this information are hospi-
tals and other health care entities,32 the Board of Medical
30. NPDB Fact Sheet, supra note 17; see also Peter A. Setness, What Do You
Know About the NPDB?, Postgraduate Med., July 1996, at 15.
31. National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on Physicians and
Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (1996).
32. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a) (1994). A health care entity must report to the
state Board of Medical Examiners if it takes a professional review action that affects a
physician's clinical privileges for more than thirty days, if a physician surrenders privi-
leges while under investigation or in return for not instigating an investigation, or-if
a professional society-when it undertakes a peer review investigation that adversely
affects a physician's membership in that society. Id. § 11133(a). The state's Board of
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Examiners,3 and individuals and entities-including insurance com-
panies-making payments as a result of medical malpractice actions
or claims. 4 The report should include the physician's name, a de-
scription of the act or conduct at issue, and any other pertinent infor-
mation, including the amount of any malpractice judgment or
settlement.35
Information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank is
maintained so that it can be queried by state medical boards and peer
review boards in the licensing, discipline, and peer review processes. 6
Information contained in the National Practitioner Data Bank is avail-
able to "[s]tate licensing boards, to hospitals, and to other health care
entities ... that have entered (or may be entering) into an employ-
ment or affiliation relationship with the physician or practitioner or to
which the physician or practitioner has applied for clinical privileges
or appointment to the medical staff." T3 Physicians may also access the
Data Bank, but only to check their own file.3 1
The rationale for the National Practitioner Data Bank is two-fold:
to prevent negligent physicians from moving to a new state to escape a
record of incompetence in the previous state,39 and to improve peer
review by providing qualified antitrust immunity to hospitals and their
peer review boards if they check the National Practitioner Data Bank
every two years as required.4°
Medical Examiners reports this information to the Secretary of the Department of
Health & Human Services. Id- § 11134(b).
33. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11132. Each state's Board of Medical Examiners must
report to the Secretary any action that "revokes or suspends (or otherwise restricts) a
physician's license or censures, reprimands, or places on probation a physician, for
reasons relating to the physician's professional competence or professional conduct,
or to which a physician's license is surrendered." Id. § 11132(a).
34. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11131. If such an entity fails to report, it is subject to a
fine of not more than $10,000. Id. § 11131(c).
35. Id 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131(b), 11132(a)(2), 11133(a)(3).
36. Johnson, supra note 7, at 407. "Persons and entities may obtain information
from the Data Bank by submitting a request in such form and manner as the Secre-
tary may prescribe." National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on
Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(b) (1996). For
each transaction a fee is determined based on the use of the electronic data processing
equipment in obtaining the information, the amount of photocopying that is needed,
postage cost, and any additional costs such as express mail. 45 C.F.R § 60.12(b).
37. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11137(a).
38. Id, § 11137(b)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(2).
39. Johnson, supra note 7, at 407. While states compile this information about
their own physicians, an individual state cannot also keep records of the other forty-
nine states. Thus, one advantage of the National Practitioner Data Bank is its na-
tional scope. Id.; see HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) ("There is a national need to re-
strict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from State to State without
disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous damaging or incompetent
performance.").
40. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a); see Setness, supra note 30, at 16. Hospitals and
their peer review boards are assumed to have checked the National Practitioner Data
Bank and to make decisions wvith knowledge of its contents. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C.
1997]
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Since the National Practitioner Data Bank's inception, however,
there has been great controversy over the extent to which, if at all, it
should be accessible to the general public.41 Congress debated the
issue when the regulations for the Data Bank were promulgated, but
decided that the information contained in the National Practitioner
Data Bank would be confidential and inaccessible by the general pub-
lic.42 If information is illegally obtained or disclosed, a penalty of not
more than $10,000 may be imposed.43
In April 1994, Representatives Ron Wyden (D-Or.) and Scott Klug
(R-Wis.) introduced a bill into Congress, "The Health Care Quality
Amendments of 1994," 44 which proposed that certain information in
the National Practitioner Data Bank, including adverse malpractice
actions and settlement payments made by practitioners with two or
more incidents, be compiled in free, semiannual booklets available in
public libraries.45 In addition, the proposed bill would have required
that medical boards report license denials in addition to license sus-
pensions and revocations, expanded National Practitioner Data Bank
access to other provider networks, and required public hospitals and
agencies, which previously did so only voluntarily, to report all ad-
verse malpractice investigations. 46 After this legislation failed, Repre-
sentatives Wyden and Klug filed additional, unsuccessful legislation in
1995 attempting once again to open the Data Bank.47 Also in 1995,
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) proposed an amendment that
would have opened the National Practitioner Data Bank to the public
to the Senate Labor & Human Resources Committee, but the Com-
mittee rejected that proposal as well.48 In July 1996, another ulti-
§ 11135(b). Therefore, if a hired physician later commits malpractice and it is discov-
ered that he had a history of negligence, the hospital and its peer review board have
potential liability for hiring him with knowledge of his past, even if they had no such
knowledge. See Ron Wyden, Transparency: A Prescription Against Malpractice, Pub
Health Rep., July-Aug. 1995, at 380 (stating how this requirement forces health care
entities to use the National Practitioner Data Bank in conducting effective peer
review).
41. See generally Robin Elizabeth Margolis, Should Patients Have Access to Na-
tional Physician Malpractice Records?, 10 No. 8 HealthSpan 24 (1993), available in
WESTLAW (discussing the debate over whether information contained in the Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank should be available to the general public).
42. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. §11137(b).
43. Id. § 11137(b)(2).
44. H.R. 4274, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess. (introduced April 21, 1994); see 140 Cong.
Rec. E757-01, available in 1994 WL 141902.
45. See Linda Oberman, Bill Would Unlock Data Bank; Medicine Says Too Much;
Consumers Say Too Little, Am. Med. News, May 9, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL
12763046 (discussing the proposed legislation).
46. See Oberman, supra note 45, at 1 (discussing the proposed amendments); Bill
Would Open Practitioner Data Bank, Med. Utilization Mgmt., April 28, 1994, avail-
able in 1994 WL 2618551 (same).
47. See Wyden, supra note 40, at 380 (discussing his plans to reintroduce legisla-
tion to open the National Practitioner Data Bank in 1995).
48. 17 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1176 (May 11, 1995), available in 1995 WL 7448032.
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mately unsuccessful bill was filed in the Senate that would have
allowed public access to the records of the 6500 medical practitioners
with at least three separate disciplinary actions or malpractice
payments.4
9
Although legislators' efforts to provide public access to the informa-
tion in the National Practitioner Data Bank have been unsuccessful
thus far, much of the same information is nonetheless available else-
where. In the private sector, various consumer and patients' rights
agencies have compiled and published information about physicians.50
For example, the Public Citizen Health Research Group, in addition
to lobbying extensively to open up the National Practitioner Data
Bank, has published its own compilation of negligent physicians,
13,012 Questionable Doctors."1 Moreover, a California company has
licensed the American Medical Association's data bank of physician
information and supplemented it with state and federal agency physi-
cian disciplinary records to provide consumers with reports about
their doctors.5 2
B. The Massachusetts and Other State Physician Data Banks
Concerned with the rising costs of health care and the public's need
to identify and avoid negligent doctors, many states are considering
the creation of their own physician data banks to provide their citizens
with information similar to that contained in the National Practitioner
Data Bank.53 Massachusetts became the first state to enact such a
law54 when it opened the nation's first toll-free consumer hotline
through which medical consumers can access information about their
physician's practice history.55 Before implementing its data bank, the
Massachusetts Secretary of Consumer Affairs appointed an Advisory
49. Your Health-" Checking up on Your Doctor: What Can You Find Out?, Con-
sumer Rep., Nov. 1996, at 62, 63 [hereinafter Checking up on Your Doctor].
50. Id. at 62.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See Gary F. Krieger, Should Your Patients Be Able to Learn All About You?
(Public Disclosure of Information About Physicians), Am. Med. News, May, 12, 1997,
at 19 ("Massachusetts already has a program to do this. So does Maryland. Florida is
about to start one, and most state legislators have bills designed in one way or another
to increase public knowledge about doctors."); see also Tait Trussell, No System Per-
fect in Trying to Protect Health of Patients, Orlando Sentinel, Dec. 8, 1996, at 3, avail-
able in 1996 WL 12432089 (discussing Florida's contemplation of a physician data
bank).
54. Massachusetts Act, supra note 23; see also Donohue, supra note 23 (discussing
the effects of the Massachusetts Act and including the Act in Appendix I).
55. See Editoria4 Disclosing Doctors' Records Can Only Help Patients, USA To-
day, Oct. 31, 1996, at 10A; Bruce Mohl, Now Consumers Can Give Their Doctors a
Checkup, Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1996, at Al. The Massachusetts data bank can be
reached by telephone at (800) 377-0550 and (617) 727-0773, Bruce Mohl, State Del-
uged by Requests for Doctor Records, Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 1996, at A36, by mail at
Board of Registration in Medicine, Attn: Profiles, 10 West St., Boston, MA 02111, id.,
or through the Internet. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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Committee on Public Disclosure of Physician Information (the "Advi-
sory Committee") to determine what information should be disclosed
and the most effective means of disseminating it.16 The Advisory
Committee decided that "[a]ll reliable information in the [State Medi-
cal] Board's possession that could be helpful to the public in choosing
doctors should be released, unless there is a compelling public policy
reason for keeping it confidential."57 The information currently avail-
able through the Massachusetts hotline includes malpractice payments
(including settlements), disciplinary actions, criminal charges, educa-
tion and awards, hospital affiliations, and insurance plans and
specialties."
The Massachusetts data bank, maintained and operated by the
state's Board of Registry in Medicine, currently contains 27,000 physi-
cian report cards59 and has been used extensively in its first few
months of existence.6° Based in part on the perceived success of the
Massachusetts data bank, other states, including Florida, Maryland,
and New York, are considering similar physician information data
bank programs.6 In addition, whatever potential benefits and detri-
ments that will result from frequent access of the Massachusetts data
bank will be amplified now that the Massachusetts data bank is acces-
sible through the Internet.62 Although this increased exposure in an
56. For a copy of the recommendations made by the Massachusetts Advisory
Committee on Public Disclosure of Physician Information in designing the Massachu-
setts program, see Francis H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice: Releasing Physician-
Specific Data to the Public, 8 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 125, 135-40 (1995-1996).
57. Id. at 128 (quoting the Massachusetts Advisory Committee on Public Disclo-
sure of Physician Information) (emphasis omitted).
58. Online, the categories are (1) demographics of each doctor's practice; (2) edu-
cation and training; (3) awards received and participation in peer review publications;
(4) disciplinary history; and (5) paid malpractice claims. Massachusetts Physician
Profiles, (visited Sept. 11, 1997), <http://www.docboard.org/ma/ma-home.htm>; see
also Donahue, supra note 23, at 115 (discussing the Massachusetts data bank); David
Armstrong, Background Profiles on Mass. Physicians Available on Internet, Boston
Globe, May 1, 1997, at B2 (same); Editorial, Disclosing Doctors' Records Can Only
Help Patients, USA Today, Oct. 31, 1996, at 10A (same).
59. Armstrong, supra note 58, at B2; Editorial, Physician Profiles: Handled Prop-
erly, Information Will Aid Consumers, Telegram & Gazette (Worcester, MA), Aug.
29, 1996, at A14; Stephanie Wood, Checking up on Your Doctor, Am. Health for
Women, March 1997, at 62.
60. On the first day the Massachusetts hotline was open, it received more than 500
calls by early afternoon. Associated Press, Phone Lines Busy in Mass. as Public is
Given Access to Doctors' Profiles, Lexington Herald Leader, Nov. 8, 1996, at A7.
Between November and May, the Massachusetts data bank received more than 50,000
requests. Armstrong, supra note 58, at B2.
61. See Krieger, supra note 53, at 19.
62. Massachusetts Physician Profiles, (visited Sept. 11, 1997) <http://
www.docboard.org/ma/ma-home.htm>; see Armstrong, supra note 58, at B2.
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electronic medium is a boon to patient rights advocates, it raises con-
cern for physician privacy rights to new levels.6 3
II. POLICY ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING PUBLIC ACCESS TO
PHYSICIAN DATA BANKS
Although the goal for both sides in this debate is an overall im-
provement in health care, the question is how best to achieve it. Pa-
tient rights advocates favor providing consumers with more
information about their doctors,64 while the medical profession main-
tains that the confidentiality necessary for effective peer review
should be preserved.65 This part examines this policy debate. First, it
discusses the two main arguments advanced in favor of providing
medical consumers with access to physician information: (a) informed
consent and (b) protection against future medical malpractice. Sec-
ond, it analyzes the medical profession's fears that weakening the con-
fidentiality of physician data banks will have a deleterious effect on
the quality of health care because physicians will compensate by
spending more time protecting their reputations and defending frivo-
lous claims and less time monitoring their negligent colleagues and
practicing quality medicine.
A. Arguments in Favor of Widespread Dissemination of
Physician Information
Patient rights advocates note that "Americans today have more per-
formance information available to them when purchasing breakfast
cereal than when choosing a heart surgeon." 66 This statement is a call
to arms for patient rights advocates across the country in their fight to
make information about physicians' practice history available to medi-
cal consumers.67 As medical malpractice incidents increase and costs
of health insurance climb higher, patient rights advocates feel it is be-
coming increasingly important to empower citizens to make informed
choices about the quality of health care they receive. To make such
informed choices, they argue, it is imperative that medical consumers
receive information about the physicians in whose hands they entrust
the health and well-being of themselves and their families.'
63. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the particular problems and unique privacy
issues implicated in publishing controversial information in a widely-available elec-
tronic format).
64. See infra Part II.A.
65. See infra Part II.B.
66. This statement was communicated by Rep. Ron Wyden (D-Or.) in his fight to
provide medical consumers with increased access to information about their physi-
cians. See Wyden, supra note 40, at 380.
67. See, eg., Margolis, supra note 41, at 24 (quoting Rep. WVyden's statement).
68. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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1. Informed Consent
The strongest argument for giving medical consumers information
about their physicians is based on the doctrine of informed consent,69
which holds that to avoid committing a battery or negligence a physi-
cian must fully inform a patient of all risks associated with a proce-
dure.7" If the patient is fully informed and consents to the treatment,
such consent mitigates against a claim of negligence brought against
the physician.7 At the same time, if a patient is not fully informed,
the patient's consent is meaningless.7" Patient rights advocates argue
that without the information contained in physician data banks, a pa-
tient is not fully informed.73 They seek to empower medical consum-
ers by providing them with information about their physicians,
arguing that such information is central to a patient's decision whether
to see a certain physician.' When this information is kept from pa-
tients, it detracts from the patient's decision-making power and rein-
forces the imbalance in power between the physician and patient.75
"Increased public access to information would be consistent with the
policy of encouraging individual responsibility for behavior, as op-
posed to relying on paternalistic control by government. 76
The strong protection that the informed consent doctrine affords
patients is clearest at the state level. Several state cases reinforce the
patient's right to know information about their physician that may af-
fect the physician's ability to practice medicine-information that
69. For a general discussion of the tort doctrine of informed consent, see William
L. Prosser et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 90-102 (9th ed. 1994).
70. James E. Ludlam, Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice 8-11
(1978) (discussing what a patient should be told to satisfy "informed consent").
71. Consent is generally considered a defense to a tort. See, e.g., Prosser, supra
note 69, at 90-102. See generally Ludlam, supra note 70, at 11-14 (describing the extent
of the physician's duty).
72. Douglas P. Biklen et al., American Association on Mental Deficiency, Consent
Handbook 8 (H. Rutherford Turnbull III ed., 1977) ("Consent is ineffective unless a
person has information about the matter (e.g., medical treatment) for which consent
is sought.").
73. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their
Physicians, 55 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 291, 330 (1994).
74. Id. ("Theoretically, a duty to disclose would maximize the autonomy of both
providers and patients .... Patients who received appropriate information could
choose whether to encounter the risks presented by a particular provider.... Patients
would not be forced to encounter risks that, given knowledge, they would choose to
avoid.").
75. Miller, supra note 56, at 125.
76. Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Pro-
posed Reforms, 13 J. Legal Med. 409, 457 (1992). Such empowerment is further aug-
mented by maintaining the information in an easily accessible electronic format. See
Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technologi-
cal Age, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 893, 897 (1984) ("[T]he accessibility to data processing
capabilities made possible by powerful personal computers has a decentralizing im-
pact, taking information power away from government and large business organiza-
tions and giving it to a newly computer-literate populace.").
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would influence the patient's decision whether to see that physician. 77
For example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals in Hidding v. Williams'7
held that a surgeon's failure to inform his patient of his chronic alco-
hol abuse constituted a breach of informed consent.79 The court held
that "[b]ecause this condition creates a material risk associated with
the surgeon's ability to perform, which if disclosed would have obliged
the patient to have elected another course of treatment, the fact-
finder's conclusion that non-disclosure is a violation of the informed
consent doctrine is entirely correct."'  Other states have relied on
similar logic to identify information, such as a physician's economic
incentives for performing certain treatments or the physician's HIV
status, that would influence a patient's treatment decision and there-
fore must be disclosed to avoid an informed consent violation."'
This theory fails to provide adequate justification for releasing all
physician information in a form accessible to anyone. The doctrine of
informed consent is based on the duty that arises from the physician-
patient relationship.' The physician-patient relationship is not estab-
lished until treatment begins. Thus, where there is no specific doctor/
patient relationship-only a relationship between a physician and the
public at large-the informed consent doctrine is inapplicable. s3
2. Protection Against Future Medical Malpractice
A second argument in favor of disclosure of the information in phy-
sician data banks is that it will decrease future medical malpractice by
allowing medical consumers to identify and thereby avoid incompe-
tent practitioners.' Consumer rights advocates have compiled a
77. See, eg., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that a patient has a right to know a physician's economic incentives); Estate
of Behringer v. Princeton Med. Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1283 (NJ. 1991) (finding no dis-
crimination where a hospital required a surgeon to disclose his HIV status to potential
surgical patients); In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. of Pa. State Univ., 595 A.2d
1290, 1302 (Pa. 1991) (upholding a court order allowing a hospital to inform potential
patients of a physician's HIV status on grounds that the potential danger to patients
outweighs the physician's privacy interest).
78. 578 So.2d 1192 (La. 1991).
79. Id. at 1198.
80. Id. at 1196.
81. Other state cases cited for the proposition of informed consent include Moore,
793 P.2d at 483 (finding a patient right to know of physician economic incentives) and
Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (finding no discrimination in a hospital's requirement
that a surgeon disclose his HIV status).
82. Phillip L. McIntosh, When the Surgeon Has HIV." What to Tell Patients About
the Risk of Exposure and the Risk of Transmission, 44 U. Kan. L Rev. 315,323 (1996).
83. See Paul S. Applebaum et. al., Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical
Practice 123-24 (1987); Ludlam, supra note 70, at 11 ("The right of the patient must be
reflected in a duty by the physician."); see also infra note 318 (observing how there
must be an actual physician-patient relationship to justify a claim for negligence based
on a physician's failure to disclose his HIV status).
84. Public Citizen, a consumer rights group that published its own list of allegedly
negligent physicians, alleges that more than one-third of all disciplined physicians
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
plethora of grisly patient horror stories in which patients suffer griev-
ous malpractice injuries only to later learn that the negligent physician
had a history of incompetence which, because this information was
not widely available, the patient had no way of efficiently discover-
ing. 5 Patient rights advocates' desire to limit or eliminate the practice
of negligent physicians is consistent with the Congressional rationale
for establishing the National Practitioner Data Bank. 86 Congressional
supporters of the HCQIA worried that, without a central monitoring
mechanism like the National Practitioner Data Bank, negligent physi-
cians would be able to commit malpractice in one state, even receive
appropriate discipline, but then move to another state and practice
unfettered.87 Practicing in a new locale, they could conceivably com-
mit future malpractice because there was no convenient way for the
latter state to discover the physician's history in the former state.88
According to Sydney Wolfe, Director of the Public Citizen Research
Group, an organization that has published its own list of allegedly
negligent doctors, "[A]s long as the information in the Data Bank is
kept from the public, most malpracticing physicians will escape pun-
ishment for their behavior."89
continue to practice medicine. Della De Lafuente, Consumer Critique: AMA Scoffs at
"Dubious Doctors" List, Chicago Sun-Times, March 29, 1996, at 39, available in 1996
WL 6738281. Consumer rights advocates argue that medical consumers have a right to
be informed and avoid these negligent practitioners. Wyden, supra note 40, at 380
("[C]onsumers have a right to know more about which health care providers they may
wish to avoid .... The last thing consumers need is for the Federal Government to
withhold vital quality information from them.").
85. See Margolis, supra note 41, at 24 (providing the example of a parent who
learned only after her daughter's death that the responsible party, her child's neuro-
surgeon, had a record of malpractice in numerous states, yet continued to hold
licenses in seven states); Laurel Shackelford, Patients Need Good Information About
Their Doctors, The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 17, 1996, at 2D (describing
how a family learned only after a Colorado anesthesiologist caused the death of their
eight-year-old child by allegedly falling asleep during the child's ear surgery that the
doctor had a history of falling asleep during surgery).
86. The HCQIA established the National Practitioner Data Bank to provide a
central mechanism for identifying negligent practitioners. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11101(2). The HCQIA, however, placed the responsibility for ensuring that negli-
gent physicians cease harmful practices solely on the medical profession itself,
through its peer review boards, and not on potential patients. See id. §§ 11132, 11133;
see also id. § 11137 (mandating the confidentiality of the Data Bank's contents).
87. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (finding that incompetent physicians' ability to
move from state to state necessitated a national remedy).
88. Johnson, supra note 7, at 407; Brian C. Mooney, The Patients Left Behind:
Doctors with Dubious Records Start Fresh in Other States, The Boston Globe, Oct 5,
1994, at 1. The purpose of the National Practitioner Data Bank, however, was to
prevent such occurrences by enlightening state licensing and local peer review boards,
not by providing this information to the general public who may or may not have a
legitimate use for it. See infra Part IV.B.4 (determining the physician information for
which the public has a legitimate use).
89. Margolis, supra note 41, at 25 (quoting Sydney Wolfe). But see Part IV.B.4
(arguing that certain information contained in the National Practitioner Data Bank,
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Because of both the long-standing tradition of protecting informed
consent and the strong public policy in favor of improving the quality
of health care, there has been great support in the courts, legislatures,
and communities throughout the country for the proposition that in-
formation about a physician's practice history is a valuable commodity
that should be accessible to the general public." Although there are
physician privacy interests involved in the information at issue,91 con-
sumer rights advocates and others argue that when these privacy inter-
ests are balanced against the compelling public need for this
information, 91 this public need outweighs physicians' privacy
interests.93
B. Policy Arguments Against Disclosure of Physician Information
Although medical consumers desire access to physician information
to improve the quality of individual health care, providing increased
access to physician information may actually have a deleterious effect
on the overall quality of health care by (a) increasing litigation and
detracting from physicians' medical responsibilities and (b) removing
the confidentiality necessary for effective peer review and, conse-
quently, decreasing the amount of self-policing practiced by the medi-
cal profession.
1. Increase in Medical Malpractice Litigation
While it may appear that access to physician information will aid
consumers, it may actually harm them through the long-term effects
disclosure could have on health care quality and costs. The medical
profession argues that exposing physicians to such publicity threatens
both their reputation and privacy.94 Physicians' efforts to reaffirm
both will create an explosion in medical malpractice litigation as phy-
sicians seek to avoid being reported to these data banks.95 Where
physicians were more willing to settle frivolous actions, they will now
such as malpractice settlement payments, is not necessarily an accurate predictor of
future negligence).
90. See generally Miller, supra note 56 (arguing in favor of public access to physi-
cian information).
91. See infra Part III (arguing that physicians have a valid, but limited, privacy
interest in this information).
92. See generally Bobinski, supra note 73, at 294-309 (discussing the types of risks
that a physician can present to an uniformed patient).
93. But see infra Part III.C. (discussing the balancing test in regards to physician
data banks and concluding that consumers' information needs are best met, not by
total disclosure, but by partial disclosure in accordance with the demands of fair infor-
mation practices to provide the public with information while simultaneously protect-
ing physicians' privacy).
94. Kong, supra note 28, at 25 (reporting doctors', insurance officials', and state
regulators' fears that malpractice information could be "unnecessarily damaging to a
physician's reputation").
95. Already, there is evidence that physicians have assumed a "fight to the death"
mentality to avoid having a file in these data banks. Ryzen, supra note 76, at 434.
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be forced to defend them in order to avoid the data banks' negative
consequences.96 An increase in medical malpractice litigation not
only affects physicians and their insurance companies,97 but the gen-
eral public as well-increased expenses resulting from additional liti-
gation 98 will be passed on to medical consumers through overall
increases in health care costs.99 In addition, physicians spending more
time and money litigating frivolous lawsuits are spending less time and
energy practicing good medicine.1 0
2. Decrease in Medical Peer Review
When physicians' privacy interests are threatened, it has a negative
effect on peer review because it undermines physicians' trust in the
peer review process and their willingness to share information about
themselves and their colleagues. 10' Although the HCQIA mandates
the reporting of physician behavior by peer review and disciplinary
boards,0 2 logically the National Practitioner Data Bank can only re-
ceive this information when the various local peer review and discipli-
96. According to Martin J. Hattlie, the American Medical Association's profes-
sional liability expert, "We already know the data bank has had the unintended effect
of making physicians reluctant to settle lawsuits .... So the verdict's still out on
whether the data does more harm than good." Linda Oberman, IG Asks Why More
Hospitals Don't Report Adverse Actions, Am. Med. News, Feb. 13, 1995, at 4, avail-
able in 1994 WL 12763046 (quoting Martin J. Hattlie). In addition, the Physicians
Insurers Association of America reported that, in 1993, ninety-seven percent of their
companies reported that physicians were less willing to settle cases because of the
National Practitioner Data Bank. James S. Todd, Just Numbers or Knowledge?, Pub.
Health Rep., July-Aug. 1995, at 377.
97. The California Large Loss Trend Study reported that "[p]roceeding to trial in
1991 cost an average of 66 percent more than in 1990." Ryzen, supra note 76, at 435.
98. While giving the public access to physician data banks may have the immedi-
ate, undesired effect of increasing the costs of and time spent on litigation, it is possi-
ble that public access to the data banks may limit litigation costs in the long run if
plaintiffs' attorneys who normally take cases on a contingency basis realize that they
will be forced to fight frivolous claims to the end-with a risk of recovering nothing as
compared to the previous instance of an assured settlement-and cease to represent
such claims. This result, however, may also be harmful to the overall quality of health
care. In the short run, physicians risk losing time and money spent litigating frivolous
claims; while in the long run, we risk chilling legitimate claims by persons who cannot
otherwise afford to litigate their claims on a non-contingency fee arrangement.
99. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Are Doctors Evading the Malpractice Data Bank?, Med.
Econ., May 28, 1996, at 52, 58.
100. In addition to spending less time practicing medicine, physicians may refuse to
treat the more difficult or risky cases to avoid such liabilities. Castrone, supra note 21,
at 3D.
101. See Gail N. Friend et al., The New Rules of Show and Tell: Identifying and
Protecting the Peer Review and Medical Committee Privileges, 49 Baylor L. Rev. 607
(1997) (discussing, in the context of Texas's current peer review privilege, the ration-
ale for peer review confidentiality and arguing that, to preserve peer review, this priv-
ilege should be protected); see also Wood, supra note 59, at 65 (noting how peer
review is already compromised by physicians' tendency to protect one another).
"Medicine has a good old boys' network like every other business." Id. (quoting Jim
Perdue, a Houston medical malpractice attorney).
102. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11132, 11133 (1994).
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nary boards have it to give. For example, peer review decisions, which
the peer review boards are required to report,10 3 can only be obtained
if the peer review process is functioning effectively. Because an effec-
tively-functioning peer review process is dependent on the accurate
reporting of a physician's behavior by both the physician himself and
his colleagues, it is essential that physicians be able to trust the pro-
cess."° When physicians have increased fear that such information
will eventually find its way into the public sphere, they may be less
likely to report even potential problems and thus curtail future
negligence. 05
For this reason, many states have sought to protect the peer review
process by granting confidentiality to its proceedings. 06 States such
as Kentucky"0 7 and California, 08 for example, have statutes that spe-
cifically make peer review reports and proceedings confidential and
inadmissible for purposes of discovery or evidence."°9 Such state stat-
utes are based on the idea that confidentiality of peer review contents
103. Id § 11133.
104. "I think (confidentiality) encourages (doctors) to come forward and make
them work without fear." James Malone, Judge Upholds Law Protecting Secrecy of
Medical Peer Review, The Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 4, 1996, at 2B (re-
porting the statement of Circuit Court Judge Ron Daniels in regards to a decision
upholding a state law protecting the confidentiality of peer review).
105. "[H]ospitals fear that doctors no longer will participate in any meaningful way
on peer review committees-mandated by federal law-if the meetings are not kept
confidential." Kathy Robertson, Court Lifts Lid on Peer Review, Bus. J. (Sacramento,
Cal.), Oct. 14, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 12821859 (reporting the medical com-
munity's fears and reactions to a California Supreme Court decision granting the Cali-
fornia Medical Board access to peer review files); see also Kathy Robertson, Top
Court Lifts Lid on Peer Reviews, San Antonio Bus. J., Oct. 21, 1996, available in 1996
WL 11762810 ("[D]octors won't be willing to participate on the voluntary panels if
they know the information may be used by state agencies .... (quoting Kim Daven-
port, legal counsel to the California Medical Association)).
106. Darricades, supra note 3, at 272-73. The privileges granted by states, however,
do not extend to cases arising under federal law. Id.
107. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.377(2) (1995); see also Donna M. Bloemer, Ken-
tucky's Approach to the Discoverability of Peer Review, 23 N. Ky. L Rev. 275 (1996)
(discussing the rationale for a Kentucky statute making information obtained or used
in peer review confidential).
108. Cal. Evid. Code § 1157 (West 1995); see also Lowell C. Brown & Robyn Mein-
hardt, Peer Review Confidentiality: Those Old Protections Just Ain't What They Used
to Be, 18 Whitter L. Rev. 99, 99 (1996) (discussing, in the context of changes brought
about by managed care, a California statute providing immunity from discovery for
peer review records).
109. "Currently, all fifty states have statutes giving varying degrees of protection to
certain medical peer reviewers." Bloemer, supra note 107, at 276 (footnote omitted).
Some of this protection is immunity from civil action similar to that granted by the
HCQIA. Id.; HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1994).
These statutes do not contradict the HCQIA's provisions. The HCQIA requires
that peer review boards report adverse decisions affecting a physician's clinical privi-
leges for more than thirty days, id. § 11133(a), not every peer review proceeding in
which a physician may be involved. When the proceeding results in sanctions, the
HCQIA gives discretion as to what evidence should be included in the National Prac-
titioner Data Bank. Id. § 11133(a)(3). In addition, as the National Practitioner Data
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is essential to encourage physicians' participation in the peer review
process" and to assure physicians that the identification of negligent
colleagues improves the overall quality of health care practiced in
their organization rather than just stigmatizes their colleagues."'
Another reason for protecting the confidentiality of peer review
proceedings is that the physician has only limited due process rights
when investigated by a peer review board. Although the HCQIA
places due process requirements on the peer review process,1 ' a peer
review proceeding is not a trial and does not fully protect a physician's
due process rights." 3 For example, numerous courts have affirmed
that a physician does not have a right to bring a private cause of action
alleging due process infringement against a peer review board for ac-
tions taken against him." 4 Therefore, a physician could witness the
destruction of his professional reputation without adequate opportu-
nity to defend himself or obtain reparation.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PHYSICIAN PRIVACY INTEREST
This part discusses the existence of a physician privacy interest that
must be weighed against the public policy favoring information dis-
semination. 1 5 First, this part chronicles the concept of privacy as it
has evolved in American constitutional and tort law and attempts to
identify a physician privacy interest based on traditional constitutional
and tort law principles found in judicial models for deciding when a
privacy right has been breached and deserves redress. Second, this
part discusses the new privacy considerations that accompany infor-
mation contained in electronic data banks and online sources, and
presents the use of "fair information practices" to best ensure the pri-
vacy of information collected in and disseminated from an electronic
medium. Finally, this part argues that, while there is no explicit physi-
cian privacy interest redressible under tort or constitutional law, the
principles of these traditional privacy frameworks should be extrapo-
Bank now exists, its contents are confidential and thus unavailable anyway as evi-
dence or discovery.
110. Bloemer, supra note 107, at 276 ("Confidentiality of the resulting minutes and
memoranda from peer review sessions has been traditionally recognized as a neces-
sary corollary to the effectiveness of these committees.").
111. Id. at 277 ("The peer review privilege is premised on the belief that, absent the
privilege, physicians would be reluctant to serve on peer review committees and en-
gage in frank evaluations of their colleagues.").
112. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1994).
113. See generally Robert D. Miller, Problems in Hospital Law 118-20 (4th ed.
1983) (discussing the limitations on due process in the peer review process).
114. See Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 21 F.3d 373 (10th Cir.
1994); Bok v. Mutual Assurance, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Doe v.
United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 871 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1994),
aff'd 66 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1995); Goldsmith v. Harding Hosp., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 187
(S.D. Ohio 1991); Evers v. Edward Hosp. Ass'n, 617 N.E.2d 1211 (Ill. 1993).
115. See supra Part II.A (discussing the policy rationale favoring dissemination of
physician information).
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lated to create a proactive data privacy model using "fair information
practices" to protect sensitive physician information before problems
arise that necessitate physicians' recourse in the courts. Such a model
would allow dissemination of physician information, but would also
encourage the public's and physicians' participation to ensure that any
dissemination is done responsibly and fairly. This Note ultimately
concludes that, because medical consumers have a valid right to calcu-
late their own risk in selecting physicians, the best way to accomplish
this goal without also jeopardizing the quality of peer review and
overall health care is to allow dissemination of physician information,
but in a manner ensuring that physicians' privacy rights are not unnec-
essarily compromised." 6
A. A Historical Basis for a Physician Privacy Interest
1. What Is Privacy?
A general privacy interest was first articulated by Louis D. Brandeis
and Samuel D. Warren in their famous Harvard Law Review article,
The Right to Privacy."7 Although their article was directed towards
the actions of the press, it set the foundation for an individual's right
to be protected from having his private affairs made public.'18
Although the Warren and Brandeis article identified a potential right
of privacy, there is no current all-encompassing definition of privacy.
Despite numerous attempts over the past 100 years to define and de-
lineate privacy, it has remained an elusive concept-it is difficult to
pin down exactly what it entails and of what its boundaries com-
prise." 9 For example, some scholars have interpreted privacy as a
property right, seeing the information a person holds about himself as
informational property that the individual alone controls and deter-
mines to whom it should be given. 120 Another way of defining privacy
116. See infra Part IV (providing a model for a federal data bank that allows dis-
semination or-physician information, yet includes standards to ensure that this dissem-
ination is accomplished in the least privacy-threatening manner as possible).
117. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privac, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890).
118. See generally Warren Freedman, The Right of Privacy in the Computer Age 1-
3 (1987) (discussing Brandeis and Warren's article and the subsequent effect it had on
privacy law); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 504 (1995) (same) [hereinafter Setting Stan-
dards]; Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemi-
nation of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395, 1405 (1987) (same); Heather
Harrison, Note, Protecting Personal Information from Unauthorized Government Dis-
closures, 22 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 775, 775-76 (1992) (same).
119. See David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and
Data Protection, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 831, 831-35 (1991); see also Peck. supra note
76, at 899 (discussing the numerous ways of interpreting a right of privacy).
120. Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Prop-
erty in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 1 (1996); Francis S. Chlapow-
ski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Information Privacy, 71 B.U. L Rev. 133,
158-59 (1991). The placing of information into data banks reinforces this concept
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is to view it as an integral component of autonomy-the right of an
individual to define his own personality, to make choices that deter-
mine who he is and how the outside world views him.' 1 The control
of personal information is important for autonomy because the ac-
cumulation of information provides power.12 2 For this reason, privacy
is better understood as a right to be protected than as a fault to be
redressed." 3 Under the autonomy formulation, maintaining privacy
standards complies with the democratic notion of keeping power in
the hands of the people and limiting government encroachment into
the lives of citizens. 124
Privacy advocates who view privacy as a measure of autonomy tend
to see it as a constitutional right meriting protection.' 5 The courts,
however, have been extremely reluctant to find such a general, all-
encompassing fundamental right to privacy. 126 Instead, the traditional
manner in which the courts have interpreted privacy has involved two
distinct types of constitutional privacy rights-decisional rights, an in-
dividual's right to make decisions about how he lives his life;1 27 and
informational rights, an individual's right to determine how others see
him by controlling the information that the general public has about
because it gives a more concrete form to the information, which then becomes a com-
modity that can be bought and sold on the open market. Chlapowski, supra, at 158.
121. Chlapowski, supra note 120, at 150-55; Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and
Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health Care System, 5 Health Matrix
1, 21-22 (1995) [hereinafter Gostin]; Peck, supra note 76, at 899.
122. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 497 ("Because the control of information
means power, standards for the treatment of personal information have significant
societal implications.").
123. Cf id. at 497-98; see Privacy Working Group, Information Policy Committee,
Information Infrastructure Task Force, Privacy and the National Information Infra-
structure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information, June 6, 1995, at 5
(visited Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipcipc-pub.html> (noting that a "criti-
cal characteristic of privacy is that once it is lost, it can rarely be restored") [hereinaf-
ter Privacy Working Group Report]; see also infra Part IV (arguing for a proactive
model to protect physician privacy before physicians need seek a judicial remedy).
124. In this manner, the right of privacy protects individuals' "human dignity" by
allowing them to create and maintain their own unique identity. Setting Standards,
supra note 118, at 498.
125. Chlapowski, supra note 120, at 150. Chlapowski's note argues that courts
should recognize a fundamental right to informational privacy. "Informational pri-
vacy must be deemed an important, if not fundamental, right to receive any substan-
tive treatment as an aspect of 'liberty' under existing due process norms." Id. at 157;
see also Flaherty, supra note 119, at 852 (arguing for a constitutional right to "privacy,
data protection, and informational self-determination"); Paul M. Schwartz, The Pro-
tection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 295, 315 (1995) ("When
the government collects personal data, a constitutional right to informational privacy
applies.").
126. Graham, supra note 118, at 1417 (discussing courts' inability to fit claims into
the existing privacy framework); see also Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg,
Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States Data Protection 76-89 (1996) (discussing
American courts' traditional treatment of informational privacy).
127. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (defining a decisional right as
"the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions").
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him."' Although the Constitution does not explicitly discuss privacy,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to imply a right to
privacy that includes a number of decisional privacy rights. 129 The
Supreme Court has not, however, established a fundamental right to
informational privacy. 3 ' This Note argues that while physicians
clearly lack a fundamental right to informational privacy, traditional
privacy principles and case law nonetheless indicate that physicians
have a privacy interest implicated by the collection and dissemination
of information contained in physician data banks.
131
2. The Government's Right to Collect Physician Information
Because physicians do not have an absolute right to informational
privacy, the first part of the inquiry is to determine what interest they
have in protecting against the collection of data in government data
banks. The seminal case involving informational privacy and the gov-
ernment's collection of information about its citizens is Whalen v.
Roe.' 32  Similar to the situation at issue in this Note, Whalen con-
cerned private individuals' rights against the Government's ability to
mandate the collection of information about them obtained from third
parties. 3 In Whalen, the Supreme Court decided whether a New
York statute that required pharmacists and doctors to report prescrip-
tions of certain drugs for compilation in a state data bank was a viola-
128. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for the Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (defining an informational right as "the individual's
control of information concerning his or her person"); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (defin-
ing an informational right as an "individual interest in avoiding the disclosure of per-
sonal matters").
129. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose an abortion); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to make decisions concerning contra-
ception); see also Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597 n.18 (listing cases that involve decisional
privacy rights); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information
and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 Iowa L Rev. 553, 575-82 (1995)
[hereinafter Privacy and Participation] (distinguishing between "independence in
decisionmaking" and "avoiding disclosure of personal matters"). Although there is
much debate concerning the bounds of decisional privacy, it is beyond the scope of
this Note and is mentioned here only to illustrate the different treatment afforded
informational privacy.
130. The court's definition of an informational privacy right is important because a
privacy right only merits full protection if it is found to be "fundamental," or -implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (limiting
fundamental rights to those dealing with "marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, and child rearing and education").
131. This Note defines the prerogative that physicians have in protecting their pri-
vacy as a "privacy interest"-it is not an absolute or actual right; but rather, a privacy
claim that must be weighed against and tempered by the considerations of the public.
See infra Part III.C (balancing the public's right to receive physician information
against physicians' rights to protect the privacy of such information and concluding
that, in this context, a physician's privacy interest is not in withholding information,
but in ensuring its responsible collection and dissemination).
132. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
133. Id. at 591.
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tion of privacy interests. 134 The Supreme Court declined to find a
fundamental right of informational privacy and employed only a ra-
tional relationship test.'35 The Court looked at the actual information
in the data bank to determine whether it was a rational solution to a
legitimate problem-did it serve a legitimate state purpose?-and
found that it did.136 Thus, after Whalen, it appears that federal and
state governments can constitutionally collect information on the per-
formance of their physicians. The Whalen analysis, however, does in-
dicate that the government must have a legitimate purpose for doing
so. While monitoring physicians is arguably a legitimate state pur-
pose, the implication from Whalen is that the government's ability to
maintain physician data banks may be predicated on its agreement to
collect and maintain information in a fair manner and only for legiti-
mate purposes.
137
3. The Government's Ability to Disseminate Physician Information
Once it is established that the government may collect the informa-
tion, two related questions emerge: What is the government's respon-
sibility once it has accumulated this information and, is an individual's
right to privacy violated by the dissemination of information from this
government data bank. Although Whalen found the government's
reasons for collecting personal information paramount, it nonetheless
recognized an existing informational privacy interest when the infor-
mation is compiled in computerized records. 138 The Court stated:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumu-
lation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files.... The right to collect and
use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a con-
comitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclo-
sures.... [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in
the Constitution .... 139
The Court's recognition that computerized data banks can invoke
unique privacy concerns shows that, while there may not be an abso-
lute right of informational privacy, neither is there an unyielding rule
favoring disclosure.'4 0 Special circumstances, such as the method of
134. Id.
135. See id. at 597-98.
136. Id.
137. See infra Part III.B (discussing "fair information practices" and their require-
ments for responsible data collection and usage).
138. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
139. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Broad
dissemination by state officials of such information, however, would clearly implicate
constitutionally protected privacy rights . . .")
140. Brennan highlights this concern in his concurrence. He states:
[T]he Constitution puts limits not only on the types of information the State
may gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central stor-
age and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential
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information collection and dissemination, may have to be considered
in weighing whether certain information should or should not be accu-
mulated and disseminated.
Cases following Whalen have been reluctant to protect plaintiffs'
informational privacy interests against government disclosure, finding
that the government's need to collect and disseminate outweighs the
plaintiffs' privacy interest.14 1 Whalen's progeny, while ultimately find-
ing in favor of information dissemination, have still not obliterated the
individual's privacy interests. For example, one line of cases following
Whalen holds that the press has a right to publish information lawfully
obtained from government records, even though such publication may
threaten an individual's privacy interests. 4 2  In Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,14 3 for example, the Court held that the State could not punish
or abridge the press's First Amendment right to publish a rape vic-
tim's name when obtained from a publicly released police report.t "
The Court limited its holding, however, to cases where the action lay
against the press and did not consider the extent to which the govern-
ment could ever protect individuals from such disclosures. 4 '
This Note does not debate whether the press can freely publish in-
formation obtained from state data banks-the case law shows it can.
Rather, it considers whether, if the information must be collected,
physicians have a right to oversee and limit the dissemination of this
information in the first place." 6 The decisions affirming the press's
right to publish information lawfully obtained from government data
for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future de-
velopments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such
technology.
Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141. See, e.g., J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no privacy
violation where state probation officials compiled and disseminated juvenile records);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding no
privacy violation in disclosing employee medical records to the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health).
142. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (finding it unconstitutional to limit
the press's right to publish a rape victim's name where the government inadvertently
provided this information); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (hold-
ing it unconstitutional to sanction the press for publishing the name of a juvenile
charged with murder); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (finding that
the press had a right to publish a rape victim's name obtained from public judicial
records).
143. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
144. Id. at 541.
145. Id. ("Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press. .. ").
146. A competing concern is that, because the information is collected by the gov-
ernment and not private parties, the public has a right of access based on the Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). This Note points out, however, that the
Freedom of Information Act is inapplicable to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
See infra notes 251-56 and accompanying text (discussing the inapplicability of FOIA
based on exception and the "central purpose doctrine").
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
banks have also reaffirmed the government's responsibility to main-
tain the security of confidential or private information.147 Therefore,
while it is unclear the extent of physicians' constitutional right to pro-
hibit the dissemination of information about them obtained from in-
formation data banks, United States Supreme Court case law
demonstrates that they nonetheless have an interest in how the infor-
mation that they are compelled to disclose is treated.' 48
4. Traditional Torts Framework as a Model for Defining a
Physician Privacy Interest
Although it is clear that physicians do not have a fundamental Con-
stitutional right to prohibit the collection or dissemination of this in-
formation, they still retain a privacy interest in the information. At
present, however, the law is not clear exactly what this privacy interest
is. One way this Note attempts to define the physician's privacy inter-
est in the information that currently is or may potentially be collected
in physician data banks is by looking to the values inherent in the
traditional privacy torts framework. Because here it is the govern-
ment that is collecting the physician information and not a private
party, the privacy torts clearly would not provide physicians claiming a
privacy violation with any sort of judicial redress. 14 9 What these torts
can do, however, is provide a framework of privacy values that can be
extrapolated and applied here to define the extent of the privacy in-
terest that physicians do have and to help determine what can be done
to protect it.15 0
147. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 534 ("The government may classify certain informa-
tion, establish and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted release .... "); Cox
Broad., 420 U.S. at 496.
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other
exposure of private information. Their political institutions must weigh the
interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press
to publish.
Id. Also, in finding that the compilation of drug prescription records did not violate
privacy rights, Whalen focused, in part, on the security and confidentiality of the data
bank. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594-95 (1977).
148. Ironically, the fact that the courts have given the press such a broad right to
publish lawfully-obtained government information may actually bolster the argument
that the government bears a responsibility for the information it collects. The subse-
quent uses sanctioned by the court, while exemplative of freedom of speech ideals,
are arguably not always the type of speech that society most wants to protect. See, e.g.,
Innovative Database Sys. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (1993) (declaring unconstitutional
a Texas law prohibiting the dissemination of government crime and motor vehicle
accident reports for purposes of lawyer and chiropractor solicitations).
149. See infra notes 153-62, 167-74 & accompanying text (discussing the torts of
false light in the public eye and public dissemination of private facts and why they are
inapplicable to physician privacy interests here).
150. See, e.g., Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander, and Related
Problems § 10.4.5.5, at 606 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing how two state courts used com-
mon law privacy principles to interpret privacy rights implicated by the government's
collection and dissemination of information).
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The foundation for the current torts privacy framework was estab-
lished by Professor Prosser in his law review article, Privacy,5' in
which he identified four privacy torts that subsequently have been
adopted in some form or amount by almost all fifty states.152 The two
torts most applicable here are (a) public disclosure of private facts,
and (b) false light in the public eye.
a. The Public Disclosure of Private Facts Tort
The tort of public disclosure of private facts provides a cause of
action for the invasion of an individual's privacy if "the matter publi-
cized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.' 5 3 Putting
aside the fact that a physician's complaint here would be against the
government and not a private party, a physician still could not satisfy
the requisite elements to bring a cause of action for public disclosure
of private facts based on dissemination of physician data bank infor-
mation. For this tort to apply, the disseminated information must be
(a) disseminated to the public; (b) identifiable as pertaining to the
plaintiff; (c) private; (d) offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities;
and (e) not of legitimate public interest. 154
Although the information contained in physician data banks is
sometimes available to the general public and identifies the physician,
it is clearly not offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities. The
element most absent here is the requirement that the information at
issue be "private." First, some of the information contained in physi-
cian data banks, such as malpractice judgments and licensing actions,
is already available through other public sources, such as courthouse
records, state medical board records, etc.15 5 Dissemination of this in-
formation would therefore be non-actionable under the public disclo-
sure of private facts torts.156 More damaging to the physician's
privacy interest, however, is the argument that the remainder of the
information at issue is not personal, but business, information and
thus subject to a much lower level of privacy protection.15, 7 Some have
151. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960). Prosser's four privacy
torts are included in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as (a) public disclosure of
private facts, (b) appropriation, (c) intrusion upon physical solitude or seclusion, and
(d) false light in the public eye. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977).
152. Freedman, supra note 118, at 5; Graham, supra note 118, at 1405.
153. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
154. See generally Sack & Baron, supra note 150, § 10.4, at 579-85 (listing and dis-
cussing the elements of the public disclosure of private facts tort).
155. See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
156. "There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to in-
formation about the plaintiff that is already public." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652D cmt. b (1977); see also Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,494-95 (1975)
(holding that where the information is public a right of dissemination exists).
157. See James R. Maxeiner, Business Information and "Personal Data:" Some
Common-Law Observations about the EU Draft Data Protection Directive, 80 Iowa L
Rev. 619 (1995) (arguing that the EU Draft Directive may provide too much data
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argued that when information concerns business activities, the public's
interest in obtaining relevant information about the product or service
they wish to purchase and the business that supplies it is much
stronger and the business's privacy interest much weaker. 158 Based on
this argument, the remainder of physician information would be un-
protected-both under the public dissemination of private facts tort
and general privacy protection principles.'59
In addition, to prevail a plaintiff must also prove that the informa-
tion at issue is not of legitimate public interest or "newsworthy."' 160
At least one case has held that information related to the public's in-
terest in policing its physicians is newsworthy and of legitimate con-
cern to the public.' 61 Also, the courts have found that the tort does
not apply to public information because "[w]hen the subject-matter of
the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of
privacy. 162 Proponents of opening the data bank to the public argue
that much of the information to which they desire access is already
publicly available through courthouse and other government records,
just not in so convenient a forum as a data bank would provide. 163
A principle derived from this tort is that information should not be
disseminated if it is not "of legitimate concern to the public." Some of
the information currently contained in the National Practitioner Data
Bank and other state data banks, while helpful for the purposes of
peer review, is not of legitimate concern to the general public." 4
While the public desires access to the information in the data banks to
protection to entities doing business with the public, thus restricting the public's inter-
est in a free flow of information).
In the United State, it is clear that collecting and disseminating business in-
formation that includes data about individuals does not automatically trigger
rights in the individual. In principle, everyone is free to collect information
from public and private non confidential sources and to use it to comment
on the business activities of one's neighbors.
Id. at 626.
158. Id. at 620.
159. This does not mean, however, that physicians have no right in the protection of
this information. While physicians are professionals, they are not absolutely akin to
business corporations. Although the information at issue concerns a physician's pro-
fessional abilities, it also directly concerns his personal reputation and private life.
160. See, e.g., Ayash v. Dana Farber Cancer Inst., No. CIV.A. 96-0565-E, 1997 WL
438769, at *5 (July 9, 1997) (defining the test for newsworthiness as whether "(a) the
general matter at issue is one that is typically of public concern, and (b) the private
facts disclosed are closely related to that matter of public concern").
161. See Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding
that policing of the medical profession is newsworthy); Ayash, 1997 WL at *6 ("Defi-
ciencies in health care are generally a matter of public concern.").
162. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d (1977).
163. See Margolis, supra note 41, at 25 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining this
information independently).
164. The best example is malpractice settlement payments. While they may help
peer review boards target potential problems, their ability to predict future incompe-
tence by a physicians is the subject of great dispute. See supra notes 327-37 and ac-
companying text.
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help it identify and avoid negligent practitioners, it has not been es-
tablished that the data bank information actually meets this goal."'-
Some of the information contained in the data banks is not evidence
of a doctor's ability to practice medicine, and even the information
that is evidence of past malpractice, such as malpractice judgments
and settlement payments, may not actually be able to predict which
doctors are truly incompetent and whether they will commit malprac-
tice in the future.166
For this reason, the AMA is opposed to including any physician
malpractice payments in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 67 and
argues that if malpractice payments must be included, only amounts
over $30,000 should be included. 6' The $30,000 threshold is based on
the assumption that amounts below $30,000 indicate the settlement of
frivolous suits, which are less likely to help patients identify incompe-
tent practitioners.169 If the public is given open access, physicians are
asked to sacrifice personal information, not to serve a legitimate pub-
lic need, but to satisfy a baseless public curiosity. 170
165. This is not to say that the information contained in the physician data banks
has no predictive value. In fact, insurers maintain data banks of much of this same
information for the purposes of calculating risk. See, e.g., W. John Thomas, The Medi-
cal Malpractice "Crisis". A Critical Examination of a Pubic Debate, 65 Temple L
Rev. 459, 477 (citing to the Insurance Service Office, which is the "central rating bu-
reau for the liability insurance industry [that] collects data from member companies,
identifies and projects trends in liability claims, and computes advisory premiums for
its members" to determine whether insurers' malpractice data truly reflects a -mal-
practice crisis"). There is a difference, however, between calculating whether a physi-
cian is going to be sued again and the likelihood that a physician will commit future
malpractice. See infra notes 326-336 and accompanying text (discussing how studies
have differentiated between the two). With regard to malpractice rates, for example,
the factors that make a physician amenable to suit are not necessarily the factors that
make him an incompetent practitioner. See Wendy Levinson et. al., Physician-Patient
Communication: The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care
Physicians and Surgeons, JAMA, Feb 19, 1997, at 553 (discussing factors besides in-
competence that put physicians at risk for a lawsuit).
166. For further discussion on the types of information that should and should not
be included in a data bank protective of physician privacy, see infra part IV.BA. Part
IV provides an ideal data bank and discusses the types of information that should be
disseminated in order to best meet medical consumer's informational needs while still
protecting physician privacy.
167. AMA Pol'y Compendium 1 355.985 (1996).
168. Id. 1 355.993(6).
169. See infra note 327 (discussing how a $30,000 limit might eliminate the inclusion
of frivolous malpractice suits); see also Ryzen, supra note 76, at 450 (proposing that
only malpractice payments over $30,000 be included in the National Practitioner Data
Bank).
170. Such information may mislead rather than enlighten consumers. See generally
Bobinski, supra note 73, at 330 (arguing against disclosure as a remedy to health care
problems). "Disclosure duties are an imperfect answer to the problem of provider-
associated risk because they (1) threaten the privacy interests of providers, and (2) are
not clearly authorized under existing legal doctrines or are uncertain in scope and
effect." Id.
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b. The False Light in the Public Eye Tort
Traditional tort law protects individuals from injury resulting from
"false light exposure" by providing a cause of action against one who
represents another to the public in a false light if "(a) the false light in
which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disre-
gard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed." ' For the false light tort to apply,
the published material at issue must be: (a) public, (b) about the
plaintiff, (c) unprivileged, (d) offensive, and (e) false. 7 As with the
tort of public disclosure of private facts, physicians are unable to bring
a cause of action under this tort because it is doubtful that a court
would consider the publication of this information as "highly offen-
sive." '173 In addition, the physician information here is true-an abso-
lute defense to this tort.174 Furthermore, it is generally accepted that
"unfairness, improper tone, and unfounded implication and innu-
endo" are insufficient to invoke the tort.175
Nonetheless, from the false light tort is extractable the value that,
even though an individual may not be able to protect the dissemina-
tion of the information itself, especially if it is already publicly avail-
able, he may still have a privacy interest in protecting how and for
what purposes the information is conveyed. Individual facts, although
singularly true, may create a false representation, or "false light,"
when combined with other facts and disseminated for certain pur-
poses.' 76 This privacy concern is implicated by the availability of phy-
sician proffiles in data banks because specific pieces of information,
such a single malpractice payment or peer review investigation, may
171. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977); see, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135-38 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that Hustler's publica-
tion of a nude picture in which plaintiff voluntarily posed for Playboy, but not Hustler,
could mislead people to think plaintiff was the type of person who would pose for
Hustler); Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630, 632-35 (Cal. 1952) (finding that a
picture of a moral, upstanding couple embracing, which accompanied an article on
how sexual attraction leads to divorce, violated the plaintiffs' privacy rights by making
it seem like they engaged in that type of relationship).
172. Sack & Baron, supra note 150, § 10.3.1, at 563 (2d ed. 1994) (presenting the
elements of the false light in the public eye tort).
173. In addition, the false light tort generally redresses damages to a person's feel-
ings-not reputation. Id. § 10.3, at 562.
174. Id. at 564.
175. Id. at 565.
176. The rationale for the false light tort is to prevent the corruption of a person's
image by the dissemination of information in a form or compilation that is "mislead-
ing" in the representation such dissemination creates. Setting Standards, supra note
118, at 505. "The minimalist restraint on misappropriation of personal information
and the narrow 'false light' protection strive to harness the circulation of deceptive
information that may manipulate citizens' perceptions of each other." Id. at 507.
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not actually indicate incompetence on the physician's part. 177 When
they are placed together in an electronic data bank that can be ac-
cessed by anyone, however, they coalesce to take a form suggesting
negligence.178 This is true even though the facts in the data bank,
taken individually, may not necessarily be evidence of incompe-
tence.179 The mere fact that this data is being compiled for the pur-
pose of allowing consumers to identify negligent practitioners creates
a presumption that any information contained in the data bank is evi-
dence of malpractice.
B. Informational Privacy in the Information Age-The Need for
"Fair Information Practices"
Physicians' privacy interests are further compromised here by the
compilation and dissemination of the physician information in elec-
tronic data banks that are accessible through the Internet." This sec-
tion discusses the unique privacy interests that must be considered
whenever information is contained in and disseminated from an elec-
tronic data bank. This section also introduces "fair information prac-
tices," precautions and safeguards that should be implemented in
order to protect these unique privacy interests.
1. Unique Privacy Concerns Invoked by the Accumulation and
Dissemination of Sensitive Information in an
Electronic Format
In identifying privacy interests, Brandeis and Warren were not ob-
livious to the effect of change on the definition of privacy."8 In their
seminal article, they stated:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in prop-
erty is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found
necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and
extent of such protection. Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eter-
nal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. 18
177. For example, with regard to settlement payments, the National Practitioner
Data Bank regulations specifically state that "[a] payment in settlement of a medical
malpractice action or claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption that
medical malpractice has occurred." National Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse In-
formation on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R § 60.7(d)
(1996).
178. For example, evidence of multiple malpractice settlements together may
jointly create an appearance that a physician is incompetent, even though each indi-
vidual payment was made to settle a nuisance suit not proven to be the result of actual
malpractice. See infra note 327.
179. See infra Part IV.B.4.e.
180. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing how the Massachusetts
data bank is now accessible on the Internet).
181. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 117, at 193.
182. Id.
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While providing citizens with more information and thus helping en-
sure a more enlightened citizenry, the use of computer data banks and
online access to these data banks have created new and unique pri-
vacy concerns that, in and of themselves, present a great threat to soci-
ety.183 Otherwise innocuous information may present an insidious
threat when compiled with other information in a data bank or when
made available for mass electronic dissemination."8 Failure to imple-
ment fair information practices erodes general confidence in the se-
curity of the network and, consequently, in the network itself.185
When the medical community loses faith in the security of information
contained in physician databases, physicians and the peer review
boards they comprise will be less willing to report data to and request
information from physician data banks,1 86 which in turn diminishes
the effectiveness of peer review and health care in general. 187
183. Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy
and Confidence in the Network, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 105, 107 (1995) [hereinafter
Fundamental Role] ("While networks may bring great benefits to society, they may
also give rise to social costs associated with the use of personal information."); see
also Dennis Campbell & Joy Fisher, Data Transmission and Privacy 501 (1994) ("The
access and dissemination of data in the age of electronics takes on new, and for many,
frightening proportions."); Dorothy E. Denning & Herbert S. Lin, Rights and Re-
sponsibilities of Participants in Networked Communities 113-19 (1994) (discussing re-
occurring concerns with protecting the information in electronic networks); Graham,
supra note 118, at 1395, 1402 ("The 'information age,' characterized by the introduc-
tion of computers into every area of life, threatens individual privacy in ways that
were unimaginable just a short time ago.... [Tihis loss of privacy is the most serious
casualty of the information age."); Peck, supra note 76, at 900-01 ("The new capacity
to store and retrieve information has not so much redefined privacy as it has en-
hanced its importance.").
184. Some have stated that it is not the processing of information, but its dissemina-
tion that is harmful. Chlapowski, supra note 120, at 133-34; Graham, supra note 118,
at 1429. Arguably, there is a legitimate purpose in compiling physician information in
data banks like the National Practitioner Data Bank. Doing so raises the general
quality of health care by improving peer review and allowing licensing boards to more
easily identify incompetent physicians. See supra Part II.A. Privacy violations none-
theless occur when this information is improperly monitored and indiscriminately dis-
seminated to the wrong individuals.
185. Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 107 ("[P]ublic and private confidence is
indispensable for robust networks to flourish, and such confidence, in turn, depends
on the fair treatment of personal information.").
186. See Ryzen, supra note 76, at 442-45 (discussing the psychological impact on
physicians of being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank even though this
same information had previously been collected by government agencies). It is argua-
ble that if the mere collection of physician information in a centralized data bank
upsets physicians, their fears will only increase if that data bank is available to the
general public.
187. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the potential negative effects on peer review
and overall health care that may result when physicians shun physician data banks out
of fear for their reputation). One possible solution is to give those about whom infor-
mation is being collected a larger role in determining how that information should be
disseminated. See Denning & Lin, supra note 183, at 99-112. In this context, the
American Medical Association could be given a larger voice, as an advocate for its
physician members, on the types and manner in which information should be dis-
seminated. The AMA already maintains its own Internet Web Page to provide physi-
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Although fair information practices should apply to all data banks,
they are particularly important when the information is available on-
line or through the Internet," as is the case with the Massachusetts
and other state data banks.18 9 When information is available on the
Internet, it is more readily and easily accessible by more people than
other methods of information dissemination. While there are benefits
to placing physician information on the Internet, at present, there are
inadequate safeguards for establishing and maintaining the integrity
of this information.'"
2. Fair Information Practices
To better maintain the information's integrity, many legal scholars
have advocated information processing systems that incorporate "fair
information practices" to protect the unique privacy concerns sur-
rounding electronic information dissemination. 191 Professor
Reidenberg defines "fair information practices" as "standards [that]
apply to the collection, storage, use, and disclosure of personal infor-
mation" in order to maintain "the integrity of personal information
and fairness to the individuals about whom the data relates."' 92 Fair
information practices take into account the effect of technology on
personal information. 193 Instead of searching for ways to remedy pri-
vacy abuses, fair information practices require that the government
takes an active role in ensuring that the information it requires is col-
lected, maintained, and disseminated in a responsible manner.9' Fair
information practices proponents advocate applying certain principles
to concrete models of data systems rather than forcing individuals to
rely on a vague concept of privacy that may or may not protect their
particular privacy interest.195
cian information. AMA Physician Select, (visited July 16, 1997) <http/Jwww.ama-assn.
org>.
188. See Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 119-20.
189. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
190. Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 120-21 (discussing how, with regard to
information on the Internet, quality measures have not improved commensurate with
quantity).
191. See Campbell & Fisher, supra note 183, at 488; Gostin, supra note 121, at 25;
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 323; Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 126, at 12-17;
Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 498.
192. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 498.
193. Id. at 323.
194. See Schwartz, supra note 125, at 323 (arguing that, because lost data privacy is
never regained, the value of fair information practices is their ability to establish a set
of proactive data protection regulations); see also Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note
126, at 12-13 (discussing European use of fair information practices).
195. Schwartz, supra note 125, at 323. "[A]bstract, generally applicable provisions
should be abandoned in favor of 'a context-bound allocation of information embodied
in a complex system of both specific and substantive regulations.'" Id. (quoting Spiros
Simitis, an international data protection expert).
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Various legal scholars and government commissions have proposed
frameworks to incorporate fair information practices in the electronic
compilation and dissemination of information. 19 6 While the compo-
nents of these frameworks differ in terminology they all represent the
same basic principles of privacy protection. For simplicity, this Note
will use the terminology adopted by Professor Reidenberg 97 in his
call for the creation and implementation of U.S. data protection stan-
dards. 9 ' Professor Reidenberg's model calls for: (a) data quality
standards, (b) transparency in information processing, (c) enforce-
ment mechanisms to ensure fair information practices, and (d) special
protection of sensitive data. 199
a. Data Quality Standards
The first step in utilizing fair information practices is to establish
standards to guarantee data quality.200 According to Professor
Reidenberg, "The benchmark of data quality consists of commonly
accepted standards to assure that personal information is acquired le-
gitimately and is used in a manner that treats fairly the interests of
individuals, industry, and society. ' '20 1 In interpreting what constitutes
data quality, Professor Reidenberg has drawn common elements from
various international data protection models that incorporate the
qualities of: (1) fair and permissible uses, (2) relevancy, (3) timeliness,
(4) accuracy, and (5) reliability.2 2 The first two criteria, fair and per-
196. See Campbell & Fisher, supra note 183, at 488; Gostin, supra note 121, at 25;
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 342-46; Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 512-16; Pri-
vacy Working Group, Information Policy Committee, Information Infrastructure Task
Force, Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing
and Using Personal Information, (visited Nov.1, 1997) <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/ipc/
ipc-pub.html>.
197. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 513-16.
198. Id.; see also Campbell & Fisher, supra note 183, at 488 (advocating a data
systems protection model similar to Professor Reidenberg's).
Key elements of an individual's privacy rights as they relate to data transmis-
sion include the right to determine how personal information is used by
others with protection against inappropriate use, openness and fairness in
person's relationship with any organization maintaining data about him or
her, including the right to know if personal data (what and where) are col-
lected, stored, and disclosed; protection against unnecessary or excessive col-
lection or dissemination of personal information; and protection against the
interception, alteration, or destruction of personal information being trans-
mitted electronically.
Id.
199. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 513-16.
200. Quality data is that which is collected only for specific purposes and used only
in a manner compatible with those purposes. Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 126,
at 13-14. Furthermore, to ensure data quality, organizations should collect the mini-
mum amount of information necessary to achieve their informational goals and take
care to eliminate information that is no longer necessary. Id. at 14-15.
201. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 514.
202. Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 110. Professors Reidenberg and
Schwartz call for international data protection standards to protect U.S. involvement
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missible uses and relevancy, require that the information collected be
used "lawfully for specific purposes. '0 3 The concept of data quality is
similar to the common law privacy notion that dissemination of other-
wise innocuous, non-violative information can nonetheless violate an
individual's privacy rights where the information disseminated ex-
ceeds the public's legitimate use for that information.2 04
In addition, quality data is that which is timely for its uses.205 After
a certain time period, data no longer represents the same proposition
it once did.' 6 Also, additional measures should be installed by those
maintaining the physician data banks to ensure they are regularly
monitored for accuracy and reliability.20 7
Another key element to ensuring high quality data is to stop secon-
dary use of the data beyond that for which it was initially collected
and disclosed. z"s Even though the information disclosed in one data
bank may not violate a privacy interest, that information re-compiled
in a different format may give the information a new character-cre-
ate a sort of "false light" interest 09-and therefore affect the person's
in the international marketplace; they adopt their standards, in part, from European
data protection proposals such as the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, Econ. Comm. Doc. COM (92) 422, 54N 287, art.
6(1)(b) (Oct. 15, 1992). See Schwartz & Reindenberg, supra note 126, at 31-36 (defin-
ing fair information practices based on European data protection principles); see also
Schwartz, supra note 125, at 324-33 (also looking to the European standards for gui-
dance in establishing a data protection standard incorporating fair information
practices).
203. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 514.
204. Professor Schwartz, in advocating the privacy rights of patients in their own
medical records, recognizes that while there are numerous legitimate uses for the col-
lection and disclosure of patient data, patients' privacy rights are compromised when
use and disclosure exceed the legitimate use. Schwartz, supra note 125, at 334 ("Use
of health care information should only be permitted for reasons that are compatible
with the purpose for which the information was collected. The principle of compati-
bility requires a significant degree of convergence-a concrete relationship-between
the purpose for which the information was gathered and its subsequent use."); see also
Gostin, supra note 121, at 25 (arguing that "information should be collected only to
the extent necessary to carry out the purpose for which the information is collected").
205. See Gostin, supra note 121, at 25 ("[llnformation should be disposed of when
no longer necessary to carry out the purpose for which it was collected .... ").
206. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Fron-
tier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195, 206 (1992).
207. Gostin, supra note 121, at 25.
208. Id ("[Iinformation collected for one purpose should not be used for another
purpose without the individual's informed consent. ); Peck, supra note 76, at 895.
In discussing the secondary uses of information, Professor Reidenberg terms such in-
formation "transaction information" or "information about information." See Funda-
mental Role, supra note 183, at 112. Professor Reidenberg notes that currently,
"[tihere is no specific restriction against overextensive collections of personal infor-
mation for transaction data." Id at 115. Although the problem of secondary usage
occurs more in the private sector, a similar risk is present with the physician informa-
tion contained in government data banks.
209. This qualification implicates the rights protected by the false light privacy tort.
Although the false light tort does not directly apply to the physician privacy interest
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privacy interest. As a result of such secondary usage, users lose con-
trol over sensitive information, and confidence in the network is con-
sequently weakened."' 0 Physicians' privacy interests are clearly
threatened when sensitive information is taken from their files and
recompiled for illegitimate purposes.211
b. Standards for Transparency of Information Processing
Although fair information practices primarily require adopting
measures to secure the integrity of protected data, they also meet soci-
etal concerns by ensuring the public the minimum necessary restric-
tion on flows of information. 2  One way to achieve this objective
without compromising privacy interests is to provide for as transpar-
ent a system of information processing as possible.213 A "transparent"
data system ensures that the data bank is open and understood by the
public who may access it,214 and especially by those about whom infor-
mation is included in the data bank.1 5 For example, transparency re-
quires that those who may be profiled be told what information about
them is being included and for what purpose.2 16 Individuals should
know what record keeping practices exist. 217 Ensuring transparency
here, it represents the value of ensuring that the data not be used to misrepresent the
information. See supra Part III.A.4.b (discussing the values inherent in Prosser's false
light privacy tort and applying them to the physician privacy interest).
210. Professors Reidenberg and Gamet-Pol note that the electronic network in it-
self is a threat to this interest because the widespread access it provides increases
opportunities for secondary usage to occur. Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 112;
see also Graham, supra note 118, at 1402-03 (discussing how the invasion of com-
puters has increased the risk that personal information is used for other than its origi-
nal purposes).
211. Such illegitimate purposes may include "trolling" by plaintiff's attorneys,
Ryzen, supra note 76, at 456 n.238, or defaming a physician with a substance abuse or
medical problem.
One way to prevent such nefarious uses is through end-use restrictions, which limit
the purposes for which the information can be disseminated and place sanctions on
unlawful secondary use of the information. For example, the AMA argues that infor-
mation obtained from the National Practitioner Data Bank should not be given to any
party who does not already have direct access to the National Practitioner Data Bank.
AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.999(4) (1996).
212. Fundamental Role, supra note 183, at 109.
213. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 515; Schwartz, supra note 125, at 336-37.
214. Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 564.
215. Schwartz, supra note 125, at 336. Professor Schwartz, in discussing the rights
of medical patients with regards to their medical records, calls for "notice of informa-
tion practices" that would provide individuals with a description of their rights and
the procedures under which such rights could be exercised; a right of correction if the
information is not timely, accurate, and complete; a reason for the collection of the
particular information about the individual and by whom the information collected is
going to be used; and the extent of disclosure. Id. at 336-37. Professor Schwartz main-
tains that "[o]nly this knowledge, provided by the notice requirement, would allow
the individual to play a role in preventing collection, storage, and use of unnecessary
information." Id. at 337.
216. Id.
217. Gostin, supra note 121, at 25.
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in information processing also requires establishing procedures that
allow individuals to check the information reported about them and a
fair dispute resolution system in the event a conflict arises over the
information's accuracy.218 In addition to meeting societal concerns, a
transparent system better protects privacy because it gives the profiled
individual more knowledge and control to ensure that the information
is not wrongly reported or subsequently abused.
c. Enforcement of Fair Information Practices
Fair information practices lose their impact if they are not sup-
ported by meaningful enforcement measures. They require "supervi-
sion and oversight of the treatment of personal information." '19 In
addition, those in charge of such information should not only ensure
its accuracy, but also adopt procedures to provide redress to those
challenging the information's accuracy.-
d. Special Protection for Sensitive Data
This requirement mandates a recognition that certain types of infor-
mation-such as race, religion, criminal convictions, health, or polit-
ical beliefs-are more sensitive and must be afforded a higher level of
privacy protection.22' Fair information practices strictly limit sensitive
information to these enumerated categories. This Note, however, ex-
pands this category. Drawing on the recognition, implicit in fair infor-
mation practices sensitivity category, that certain types of information
deserve different degrees of privacy protection, this Note attempts to
categorize information into differing levels of dissemination based not
only on the information that fair information practices labels as sensi-
tive, but also on the information's ability to satisfy other fair informa-
tion practices requirements, such as data quality. ' -
C. Proactive Data Protection Model Based on Physicians'
Privacy Interests
As Part III has shown, physicians do not have a clearly defined right
to protect the information contained in federal and state physician
data banks from being disseminated to the general public. A recur-
ring theme running through the law's treatment of privacy has been
the process of weighing the public's right to know information against
218. Id
219. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 515. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 125, at
341-42 (arguing for a United States Data Protection Board to serve as a "general
privacy protection agency").
220. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 515; Gostin, supra note 121, at 25.
221. Setting Standards, supra note 118, at 515.
222. See infra part IV.B.4 for a discussion of the types of physician information that
should and should not be available to the general public.
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the individual's right of privacy.22 3 Considering physician data banks
in the context of this traditional balancing test, the physician is likely
to lose because the public's strong right to make choices and calculate
their own risk outweighs the physician's ambiguous interest in main-
taining the confidentiality of diverse types of public and private
information.
The balancing test does not mean, however, that there is an abso-
lute right to dissemination of all physician information. Professor
Schwartz has argued that, in most cases, individuals' privacy will lose
out if data protection is considered as this all-or-nothing proposition
between full disclosure and a "right to seclusion," or right of an indi-
vidual to withhold information from the public.224 To ensure data
protection and the use of fair information practices, he instead advo-
cates a model of "privacy as participation. ' 225 In this model, the ques-
tion is not what personal information an individual can withhold, but
how to monitor the collection and dissemination of information so as
to encourage citizens to participate in the process, by ensuring that the
"individual's capacity for decisionmaking is respected and en-
couraged." '2 26 Professor Schwartz's model addresses the privacy bal-
ancing test by arguing that "[d]ata protection law in the computer age
223. In interpreting Whalen, several of the circuits have found that Whalen requires
a balancing test of the individual's right to privacy against the state's reasons for com-
pilation and disclosure. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-
80 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978); see
also Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 575 ("Whalen and its progeny reveal
an American constitutional right of informational privacy that is suspended between
privacy paradigms of participation and seclusion."); Chlapowski, supra note 120, at
146 (noting that Whalen established the foundation for subsequent courts to find "an-
other level of scrutiny in substantive due process analysis, one which focuses on a
consideration and balance of public and private interests in legislation"). But see J.P.
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussing these cases and dis-
agreeing with the balancing test).
Other commentators have agreed. See Freedman, supra note 118, at 11 (discussing
the use of the balancing test with regard to patient information); see generally Gostin,
supra note 121, at 17 (discussing how, in a health care setting, an individual's privacy
and autonomy must be balanced against society's need for an efficient and safe health
care system). "The balancing test requires the Court to weigh the state's need to
protect the general welfare through its police power against an individual's right to
prevent unnecessary governmental interference." Grace K. Hogan & Nichole Wertz,
Privacy, Privilege and the Right to Know: Disclosure of AIDS/HIV Status in the Physi-
cian-Patient Relationship, 11 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 805, 811 (1996).
224. Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 558 ("[I]nformation seclusion is
rarely achievable; when gathering personal information is the objective, good, per-
haps even excellent, reasons will often exist not to leave someone alone."). In the
balancing context, "[p]rivacy as information seclusion tends to collapse in the face of
the weighty reasons provided in support of seeking personal information." Id. at 559.
225. See Privacy and Participation, supra note 129.
226. Id. at 555. "In the computer age, individual freedom cannot rest on a dream of
being let alone by an ever-reduced government. Today, the safeguarding of liberty
requires a legally structured pattern of access to and limitations on the use of personal
information." Id. at 618.
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should respond by creating social patterns of access to and limitations
on the use of personal information. 'W11
7
Drawing on Professor Schwartz's "privacy as participation" model,
this Note argues that while physicians do not have a clear right to
keep all information out of the public sphere, they nonetheless have
an interest in protecting and governing how information about them is
collected and used. They have an interest in ensuring the information
is collected and disseminated responsibly and in conformity with fair
information practices.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL DATA BANK WITH LIMITED
PUBLIC AccEss
Acknowledging that medical consumers have a legitimate right to
conduct their own risk calculations in choosing physicians and drawing
on Professor Schwartz's model of "privacy as participation," this Note
presents a model physician data bank meant to satisfy the competing
interests of both medical consumers and physicians, and ultimately to
work towards improving health care. This part advocates amending
the HCQIA and the National Practitioner Data Bank regulations to
provide the public limited access to the National Practitioner Data
Bank and to reflect the importance of fair information practices in
ensuring physician privacy.
To arrive at this solution, this part first examines the different stan-
dards of privacy protection among the several states and between the
states and the federal government, and considers the interstate com-
merce problems created by multifarious state data banks, which un-
dermine the privacy protections that the Freedom of Information Act
and the Privacy Act have already imposed on the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank. This Note determines that a federal data bank best
avoids such problems. Taking into consideration the reforms advo-
cated by the American Medical Association, this part then argues that
the guidelines for the proposed federal data bank should improve
upon the standards established in setting up the National Practitioner
Data Bank to fully incorporate fair information practices. Finally, fol-
lowing up on the privacy values inherent in common law traditions of
privacy and fair information practices, this Note examines the types of
information that either are or may potentially be contained in and
disseminated from physician data banks, and determines which types
of information should be disseminated and which should not. This
limited dissemination, wherein medical consumers receive the infor-
mation they need to assess risk, yet physicians maintain confidentiality
of misleading and more "sensitive" information, will, in the long run,
have the most positive effect on the overall quality of health care.
This Note concludes that a federal data bank with limited public dis-
227. Id- at 616.
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closure will provide medical consumers with the information they
need to make prudent decisions, thus alleviating the need for state
data banks that provide indiscriminate and, ultimately, privacy-viola-
tive information.228
A. A Federal Remedy
1. Differences Between the States in Privacy Protections
States differ dramatically in the consideration given privacy inter-
ests.229 In particular, protection for informational privacy rights dif-
fers from state to state"3 This inconsistency, standing alone, is a
threat to privacy" 1 because, in an age where information can instanta-
neously travel across state borders, an individual's privacy right in any
state is only as strong as that of the state offering the least privacy
protections.232 The states' lack of privacy protection for their citizens
is a strong rationale for a federal remedy.23
Because states have diverse views of informational privacy, it is not
surprising that they disagree over what physician information should
228. This Note does not, however, argue for legislation prohibiting state data banks
or limiting their exercise. To do so without a fundamental right to physician privacy
would invoke federalism problems because the right to regulate physicians is a tradi-
tional state power. James F. Blumstein, A Perspective on Federalism and Medical Mal-
practice, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 411, 412-13 (1996) (discussing how areas of medical
malpractice and medical licensing are traditionally areas of state concern). But see
Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level?
Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 Vill. L. Rev., 129,
138-39 (1996) (arguing that health care is interstate business).
At the same time, this Note does point out that, while the existence of a federal
data bank does not compromise states' interests, various state data banks giving ac-
cess to information that the federal government has mandated should be private un-
dermines the security and efficacy of the federal data bank. Ultimately, states should
not need to create their own data banks once limited access to the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank is provided.
229. See Campbell & Fisher, supra note 183, at 499 ("Some states have virtually no
privacy laws, while others, such as California, have incorporated the right of privacy
into the State Constitution."); Bruce D. Goldstein, Confidentiality and Dissemination
of Personal Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection,
41 Emory L.J. 1185, 1210 n.144 (1992) (providing case law to demonstrate the varying
classifications of what qualifies as a privacy interest).
230. "State law that does exist represents a patchwork of inconsistent and inade-
quate protection of informational privacy." Gostin, supra note 121, at 8. "Some data
protection exists in every state, but no two states have adopted precisely the same
system of regulation." Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 604. Besides dis-
agreeing as to what information collection violates privacy rights, "[s]tates also differ
widely on how, when, and to whom protected data files may be released." Goldstein,
supra note 229, at 1198.
231. Goldstein, supra note 229, at 1194 ("The threat to individuals lies in the very
diversity of standards."); Schwartz, supra note 125, at 310.
232. Where informational privacy is concerned, even subtle differences in the way
information is disseminated and what penalties will be imposed for wrongful promo-
tion can effect an individual's privacy rights. Goldstein, supra note 229, at 1195, 1198-
1200, 1202.
233. Gostin, supra note 121, at 16-17.
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be included in physician data banks and over what physician informa-
tion should be disseminated to the public.' This disparity, however,
is inconsistent with one of the main goals of recording physician infor-
mation in data banks-preventing incompetent physicians from com-
mitting malpractice or other prohibited behavior and then escaping
liability by moving to another state that has no means of discovering
their past behavior.35 If states have different requirements, a doctor
with a nefarious past can hide past misdeeds by simply moving to a
state that does not." 6 Having physicians held to different standards of
professional accountability is at odds with the national goal, as stated
in the HCQIA, of improving the quality of health care nationwide.3 7
2. Differences in Privacy Protections between the States and the
Federal Government
In addition to state discrepancies over privacy rights, there is a
growing disparity between the states and the federal government con-
cerning citizens' informational privacy rights.2" At the federal level,
two main statutes govern the government's treatment of the personal
information that it collects. The Freedom of Information Act, or
"FOIA,"239 "structures third-party access to federal records '' 2 0 and
includes exceptions for the privacy of certain types of information.
The Privacy Act of 1974241 is an "omnibus data protection measure
that regulates how federal agencies collect personal information and
apply it in decisionmaking. ' '242 These two statutes work together to
govern the government's treatment of personal information. 4 3 These
privacy protections, however, are not equally available at the state
level. Although most states have some version of a FOIA statute,
many of these statutes lack the privacy exemptions that the federal
FOIA has.2' In addition, most states do not have a privacy statute
234. For example, while states such as Massachusetts release malpractice informa-
tion, other states, such as Maryland, have laws to keep such information confidential.
Maryland's Jaunt onto the Information Superhighway Hits Speed Bumnp, Rep. on Med.
Guidelines & Outcomes Res., 1997 WL 8623929, *2 (Feb. 20, 1997), available in 1197
WL 8623929.
235. See HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (1994).
236. Id.
237. Id. § 11101.
238. Christopher P. Beall, The Exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Informa-
tion Law, 45 Duke LJ. 1249, 1252 (1996). Some have stated that this gap appears to
be widening. Id.
239. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522 (1994) [hereinafter "FOIA"I.
240. Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 583.
241. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
242. Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 583.
243. See id. at 593-95 (discussing the interrelationship between the two statutes).
244. See id. at 605.
The weaknesses of state data protection law are heightened by the effect of
state-level Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA). All states have statutes
that regulate public access to governmental records; only some of these lavs
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equivalent to the Privacy Act.245 Because the Privacy Act contains
many protections similar to fair information practices, the absence of
a Privacy Act state equivalent has a harmful effect on the quality of
data protection at the state level.24 6 The privacy statutes that do exist
at the state level are often either overly broad or narrowly tailored to
specific types of information. 47
In interpreting state statutes, courts have likewise favored disclo-
sure over the protection of privacy.24 8 At the same time, the recent
trend in federal case law has been to interpret Federal access statutes
extremely narrowly so as to insulate privacy rights. For example,
FOIA is the main authority for citizens to gain access to government
records.249 In the past few years, however, despite the proclamation
that FOIA is to be construed in favor of disclosure," citizens have
encountered increasing difficulties in gaining access because courts
have strictly construed FOIA and applied the central purpose doc-
trine. '' 251 The "central purpose doctrine" holds that the "central pur-
pose of FOIA is to provide the public with a means to monitor
government activity and that any information that does not fulfill this
purpose is exempt and should not be disclosed. ', 2 For example, in
United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press,2 53 the Supreme Court held that when the informa-
take, however, the path of the federal statute and provide explicit protection
for privacy.
Id.
245. Id. at 566 ("Most states lack laws, similar to the Privacy Act, that regulate the
governmental use of personal information.").
246. Id. at 603-05 (discussing how, without state laws similar to the federal Privacy
Act, state law lacks critical fair information practices).
247. See generally Beall, supra note 238, at 1252, 1284-95 (1996); Peck, supra note
76, at 897 nn.25-26 (providing a description of broad state statutes and citing certain
narrowly-interpreted privacy rights that states have chosen to protect).
248. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 306-07 (10th Cir. 1981)
(upholding a Colorado court decision that the public's legitimate concern with the
fitness of its professionals outweighed a physician's privacy interest in keeping her
name, photograph, psychiatric history, and marital problems out of a magazine arti-
cle); Kees v. Medical Bd. of Cal., 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 119 (Cal. App. 4th 1992) (find-
ing a statute authorizing the Board to order an impaired physician to undergo a
mental exam did not violate the physician's privacy rights); State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs
v. Fenwick Hall, 419 S.E.2d 222, 224 (S.C. 1992) (holding that the public's need to
know of a physician's past drug abuse outweighed a threat to a physician's privacy);
see also Beall, supra note 238, at 1295 ("[S]ome states recently have taken a substan-
tially more expansive approach to the recurring struggles between disclosure and pri-
vacy than the federal courts.").
249. See, e.g., Durham v. United States Dep't of Justice, 829 F. Supp. 428, 433
(D.D.C. 1993) ("[T]he goal of FOIA is to permit the public to scrutinize the activities
of government; it is not intended to foster the dissemination of information gathered
by the government about private citizens for the use of other citizens.").
250. See FOIA, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552, cmt. 1 (West 1996).
251. BeaU, supra note 238, at 1252, 1255-58.
252. Id. at 1258.
253. 489 U.S. 749 (1988).
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tion requested is not a record of the government's activities, the
privacy interest is at its apex? -54 Other courts have followed Reporters
Committee and have been generous in applying the central purpose
doctrine."ss The National Practitioner Data Bank's contents are the
government's collection of information on physician performance and
do not contain information on how the government itself is operating.
Therefore, based on the recent interpretation of the central purpose
doctrine, it is likely that courts would find the contents of the National
Practitioner Data Bank also immune from FOIA's provisions.2's
The federal-state split over the amount of informational privacy af-
forded individuals mirrors the debate over whether physician data col-
lected in government data banks should be available to the public in
the first place. Despite numerous challenges,' Congress has, thus
far, refused to make public the contents of the National Practitioner
Data Bank.5 8 At the same time, the same physician information con-
tained in the National Practitioner Data Bank will become increas-
ingly available, compromising the National Practitioner Data Bank, if
more and more states follow Massachusetts and open to the public
state depositories of physician information, which contain much of the
same information that is kept confidential by the National Practitioner
Data Bank.
3. A Federal Data Bank Solution
Because the overriding goal is the uniform improvement in health
care, one way to accomplish this is by allowing the public access to a
federal data bank governed by federal laws managing the treatment of
254. Id at 780.
255. United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487
(1994); United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); Harvey v. United
States Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A. 96-0509, 1997 WL 669640, at 04 (D.D.C. Oct. 23,
1997); see also Beall, supra note 238, at 1256-63 (discussing the case law for the use of
the central purpose doctrine in the federal courts).
256. See Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Serv-
ices Administration, National Practitioner Data Bank 1996 Annual Report, at 4
(visited Dec. 13, 1997) <httpJ/vww.hrsa.dhhs.govlbhpr/dga/an96.htm> ("The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services has implemented this [confidentiality] require-
ment by designating the Data Bank as a confidential "System of Records" under the
Privacy Act of 1974.") [hereinafter "NPDB 1996 Annual Report"]; Department of
Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Guide-
book, at 3 (visited Dec. 13, 1997) <http'J/wv.hrsa.dhhs.govbhpr/dgalsource.htm#l>
(describing the National Practitioner Data Bank in relation to FOIA and the Privacy
Act); see also NPDB Fact Sheet, supra note 17 ("The limited access provision of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, as amended, supersedes the disclo-
sure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, as
amended.").
257. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (describing Congressional efforts
to publicize the National Practitioner Data Bank contents).
258. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (1994); National Practitioner Data Bank for
Adverse Information on Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, 45 C.F.R.
§ 60.13 (1996).
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government information. While the states provide both dissemination
and privacy protection indiscriminately and unevenly25 9 applying fed-
eral statutes would ensure that a physician in Maine has the same
amount of privacy protection as a physician in Oregon, and a potential
patient in New York has the ability to obtain the same amount of in-
formation about her doctor as a potential patient in California. Lim-
ited access to the National Practitioner Data Bank better protects
physician privacy interests than state data banks because a federal
data bank invokes the regulations and requirements of various federal
statutes, including the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act, that have been established to guide administrators in weighing
the public's need for information against the information subject's pri-
vacy interest.2 60 For example, FOIA reassures citizens of their demo-
cratic right to receive information concerning their government's
activities-information that their status as citizens affords them-
while the Privacy Act is Congress's attempt to reaffirm privacy rights
and, therefore, grants certain protections to those whose privacy is be-
ing threatened. 6'
The Privacy Act recognizes the government's legitimate need to col-
lect information, sometimes even personal information, from private
citizens; yet it also acknowledges the potential for harm should the
government's ability to do so be abused. 62 Congress thus enacted the
Privacy Act to ensure the accuracy of the information the government
collects, to protect personal and private information from unauthor-
ized disclosure,2 63 and to bolster the privacy protections afforded indi-
viduals under the FOIA exemptions. 2"
Because the Privacy Act specifically addresses privacy concerns in-
volving personal information collected in government data banks, it is
not surprising that many of its requirements are similar to those advo-
cated as "fair information practices. 2 65 For example, to ensure "data
quality, ' 266 the Privacy Act limits collection to only that information
259. See supra Part IV.A.1.
260. "The overall design of the Act was to balance the interests of public access
with the necessity of retaining confidential matters of agencies from public view."
Smith v. Flaherty, 465 F. Supp. 815, 819 (M.D. Pa. 1978). FOIA exemption 7(C)
protects personal information by requiring a balancing of the information subject's
rights against the public policy for dissemination. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)
(1994).
261. Harrison, supra note 118, at 778 ("Congress has statutorily acknowledged the
right of the citizen to control publication of personal/private information about him-
self via the 'privacy exemptions' of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act.").
262. Id. at 782.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 786. The two are meant to be read together. FOIA cannot mandate
disclosure of information that the Privacy Act makes exempt. FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552,
n.10 (1994).
265. See supra Part III.B.2 (defining and discussing fair information practices).
266. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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relevant to the purpose for which such information is being com-
piled.' 7 Also, the Privacy Act seeks to ensure that the information
contained in government data banks is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete.268 In order to protect against improper secondary data
uses," 9 the Privacy Act requires that information subjects be in-
formed when information about them is being disseminated.270 The
Privacy Act also features transparency requirements similar to those
advocated by fair information practices.27'
The hallmark of the Privacy Act is its requirement that information
subjects have access to their own records.2' This requirement, analo-
gous to the data quality category of the fair information practices par-
adigm,273 provides for detailed procedures to allow an individual to
contest and amend his report.274 Although some scholars have criti-
cized the Privacy Act as failing to fully incorporate fair information
practices,275 at present, the Privacy Act and FOIA provide a starting
point for standards that must be employed when the government col-
lects and disseminates information about citizens,276 and which can be
improved upon by the full application of fair information practices
and applied to a federal physician data bank that provides physician
information through an electronic medium.
267. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1994).
268. Id §§ 552a(e)(5), 552a(e)(6).
269. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
270. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3). Section 552a(e)(10) requires that safeguards be estab-
lished to protect the security of information that is designated confidential.
271. According to the Privacy Act, any agency that maintains a system of records
must tell individuals from whom it requests information its authority for requesting
the information and whether the disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, the purpose
for which the information is to be used, the routine uses of the information, and the
consequences should the individual fail to supply the required information. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(e)(3).
These requirements, however, are less effective when applied to physician data
banks. Although the Privacy Act mandates that agencies obtain this information di-
rectly from the subject whenever possible, id. § 552a(e)(2), here third parties, not the
physicians themselves, report the information to the government. One way the trans-
parency requirement reemerges in the Privacy Act is the Act's requirement that rou-
tine uses of information be disclosed in the Federal Register. Id. § 552a(e)(4)(d).
Although individuals are less likely to read the Federal Register, the Privacy Act
nonetheless provides a source for physicians to learn to what use information about
them is put.
272. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d); see also Harrison, supra note 118, at 793.
273. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
274. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1)-(3).
275. See Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 566-84 (arguing that the rou-
tine use exception and computer matching limit the Privacy Act's ability to ensure
data quality). But see James Rule et al., The Politics of Privacy 101-03 (1980); NPDB
Fact Sheet, supra note 17 (stating how the Privacy Act protects the confidentiality of
the National Practitioner Data Bank).
276. See Privacy and Participation, supra note 129, at 566 (arguing that the Privacy
Act provides a better foundation for fair information practices than disparate state
laws).
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B. The Proposed Data Bank Should Incorporate Fair
Information Practices
While many of the privacy protections mandated by the Privacy Act
and FOIA exceptions and included in Professor Reidenberg and
others' models are lacking or not readily apparent in the state data
banks, vv they are already included, to a certain extent, in the legisla-
tion establishing the National Practitioner Data Bank. For example,
consistent with data quality, 278 the HCQIA provides for the informa-
tion collected about a physician to be disclosed to that practitioner,279
and requires procedures for a physician to dispute the accuracy of the
information.8" There are, however, many areas of data protection
still lacking. This Note, therefore, argues that the HCQIA and the
regulations for the National Practitioner Data Bank should be
amended to ensure that the proposed, partially-open National Practi-
tioner Data Bank contains additional privacy protections based on fair
information practices. One source of these additional privacy protec-
tions is suggested in the American Medical Association's Policy Com-
pendium, which presents the AMA's goals for a National Practitioner
Data Bank more protective of physician interests.28' This Note con-
siders the National Practitioner Data Bank regualtions and the
AMA's suggestions concerning the fair information practices catego-
ries: (1) data quality, (2) data transparency, (3) enforcement mecha-
nisms, and (4) special protections for sensitive data." 2
1. Data Quality
Fair information practices mandate that information collected and
maintained in electronic databases such as the proposed physician
data bank be checked for relevancy, accuracy, and timeliness.2 83
Although the Federation of State Medical Boards recognizes the im-
portance of providing consumers with information about negligent
physicians, it has traditionally resisted making the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank available to the public because of concerns about
the quality of the information and its relevancy to the general
public. 284
277. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
278. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
279. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11136(1) (1994).
280. Id. § 11136(2).
281. AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.000 (1996). The AMA has traditionally called
for the complete eradication of the National Practitioner Data Bank. AMA Pol'y
Compendium 355.991 (amended res. 828, 1-91). At the same time, the AMA calls
for standards to secure physicians' privacy protections within the existing Data Bank.
282. This section will be discussed infra Part IV.B.4 where this Note proposes the
types of information to which the public should have access.
283. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
284. "Our concern is not whether [the National Practitioner Data Bank] should be
made public, .. . but that it's quality information." Jan Greene, Getting the Lowdown
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In conformity with the Privacy Act framework, the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank guidelines control who has access to the information
and limit the purposes for which the information is used and dissemi-
nated.8 5 One way to ensure that disseminated information is relevant
is to include in the amended statute end use restrictions that specifi-
cally state to whom the information can be disseminated and the lim-
ited purpose for which the information can be used (to choose
physicians),.1 6 This Note advocates specific statutory end use restric-
tions to prohibit and even impose punishment for those who wrong-
fully use the information or further disseminate it to secondary
parties. For example, the AMA Policy Compendium calls for assur-
ances that information taken from the National Practitioner Data
Bank is used only for those purposes consistent with the rationale of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and is not abused through
wrongful secondary uses.' 7 In addition, in order to ensure informa-
tion is timely, the AMA has advocated that information in the Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank be "purged" after five years.'
2. Transparency
The transparency requirement of fair information practices man-
dates that individuals, especially those about whom information is be-
ing included in a data bank, know that information about them is
being collected or disseminated and the reasons why such collection
and dissemination is occurring." 9 The AMA, in addition to its own
educational initiatives, advocates alerting physicians to the existence
of the National Practitioner Data Bank and the risk of broad dissemi-
nation of information reported to it."g The AMA also advocates al-
erting physicians when their file has been queried.9 1-
on Doctors, Hospitals & Health Networks, Jan. 20, 1997, at 62 (quoting Dale Austin,
the Federation of State Medical Board's deputy executive vice-president).
285. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 60.11 (1996) (discussing -[w]ho may request information
and what information may be available"). Although this Note argues that the public
should have more access than they currently have, the NPDB guidelines still place
limits on who has access and to what information, as opposed to state systems follow-
ing the Massachusetts model, which would apparently disclose information
indiscriminately.
286. The HCQIA places an end use restriction on the information currently con-
tained in the National Practitioner Data Bank. HCQIA, 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(3)
(1994) (stating that the information "is intended to be used solely with respect to
activities in the furtherance of the quality of health care").
287. AMA Pol'y Compendium 1 355.989(2) (1996).
288. Id T 355.999(2); Johnson, supra note 7, at 411. The AMA does not, however,
include license revocations in the information that should be purged. Id.
289. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
290. AMA Pol'y Compendium $ 355.998. The AMA argues that physicians must
be notified when their file is queried and calls for improved notice procedures. AMA
Pol'y Compendium 1 355.995(4), 355.996, 355.997.
291. Id. 1 355.995(4).
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3. Enforcement Mechanisms
For a physician data bank to incorporate fair information practices,
there must be procedures to monitor the data bank's accuracy and to
challenge an entry claimed erroneous.29 This requirement places
more responsibility on agencies such as the Department of Health and
Human Services (the agency maintaining the data bank) to ensure
that the proper information is collected and monitored for
accuracy.
293
The National Practitioner Data Bank guidelines mandate that phy-
sicians be given access to their own records, 294 and have established
grievance procedures295 for physicians who wish to contest aspects of
their record. 296 The AMA Policy Compendium seeks to ensure that
physicians continue to be able to attach an explanation to their report
in the National Practitioner Data Bank,297 and argues that this expla-
nation should travel with a physician's report whenever it is used.298
In addition, the AMA also proposes allowing physicians an extended
time to verify information reported to the National Practitioner Data
Bank.299
4. Special Protections for Sensitive Data
As mentioned earlier, fair information practices require that certain
enumerated categories receive extra privacy protection.30 0 The only
information at issue in physician data banks that falls into these cate-
gories is information concerning a physician's health or substance
abuse history.3 1 This Note therefore argues that this information
should remain confidential.
This Note expands on the fair information practices categorization
of information into degrees of sensitivity by further delineating other
categories of information deserving more or less privacy protection.3°
While not necessarily "sensitive" in the strict use of the term, other
types of information nonetheless deserve privacy consideration based
on its inability to meet other fair information practices requirements.
This section argues that certain types of information, including
court judgments, state medical board licensing and disciplinary deci-
sions, and education, specialties, and awards, will aid consumers in
292. See supra Part III.B.2.c.
293. AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.993(1)(b) (1996).
294. 45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(2) (1996); see Johnson, supra note 7, at 408.
295. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14; see Johnson, supra note 7, at 410-11.
296. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14.
297. AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.993(4) (1996).
298. Id. 355.999(5).
299. Id. 355.993(7) (1996).
300. See supra Part III.B.2.d.
301. See supra text accompanying note 221 (listing the categories of information
traditionally considered "sensitive" and deserving of higher privacy protection).
302. Id.
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choosing physicians more than they will hurt physicians by their dis-
closure. Therefore, based on the privacy balancing test, such informa-
tion should be disclosed. Other types of information, however, such as
peer review decisions and malpractice settlements, present a greater
threat to physician privacy interests. Therefore, this Note argues that,
to remain in accordance with traditional privacy notions and fair infor-
mation practices, if such information is to be available to the general
public, its disclosure should be limited and accompanied by limiting
procedures such as end use restrictions.
a. Court Judgments, Criminal Convictions, and State Licensing
Denials, Revocations, and Suspensions
Information concerning court judgments, criminal convictions, and
medical license denials, revocations, and suspensions is already avail-
able to the public from various media. 303 Medical consumers argue
that such information is helpful to them in identifying negligent doc-
tors, but that it is often widely dispersed and difficult to obtain, espe-
cially when it is needed in a short time period."° They argue that
because such information is in the public domain, the government
cannot rightfully conceal it from the public.30 As citizens, they have a
right to this information."° Therefore, this Note argues that because
this information is already available, the potential harm to physician
privacy interests is minimal. Although there is a valid right of access
based on the information's place in the public records, certain privacy
protections may still apply. Privacy advocates argue that by compiling
the information, a new privacy interest is threatened,' and that just
303. See Checking up on Your Doctor, supra note 49, at 62 (discussing how licensing
and disciplinary reports are available from state medical boards); Wood, supra note
59, at 102 (discussing how court judgments are available through courthouse records).
304. See Margolis, supra note 41, at 25. "[Mlost of the information in the Data
Bank is already publicly available, just not easily or consistently available ... [Bleing
able to access this information from a centralized base will save time, money, and
most importantly, lives." Id. (quoting Laura Wittkin, Executive Director of the Na-
tional Center for Patients' Rights, a malpractice victims' and patients' rights advocacy
group).
305. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that the public has a
right to information contained in the public domain). But see Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (arguing that this right is limited in the interests of
national security). But, just because the public has a right to this information does not
mean the government should recompile it and provide it in an easily available format.
306. Rep. Ron Wyden argues that, since federal taxes are used to pay for the Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank, taxpayers have a right to its information. Margolis,
supra note 41, at 24. But see Robert E. Oshel et al, The National Practitioner Data
Bank-- The First 4 Years, Pub. Health Rep., July-Aug. 1995, at 383, 384 ("Although
taxpayer funds covered development and startup costs, the Data Bank currently is
funded entirely by user fees."); NPDB 1996 Annual Report, supra note 256, at 4 ("As
mandated by law, all Data Bank costs are recovered from user fees; no taxpayer funds
are used to operate the Data Bank. The Data Bank fee structure is designed to en-
sure that the Data Bank is self-supporting.").
307. See supra Part III.A.3.
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because information is public does not mean the public has an abso-
lute right of access to it in any form.308 Certain restrictions such as
timeliness, accuracy, and relevance may still apply.309 So long as there
are safeguards in place to ensure the information's accuracy, rele-
vance, and timeliness, disclosure helps more than it harms, and this
information should be accessible to help medical consumers choose
physicians.
b. Education, Specialties, and Expertise
At first glance, information about a physician's education, special-
ties, and expertise, which is widely available through a variety of
sources including the American Medical Association's Web cite,3 0
seems relevant to consumers' interests and innocuous to physician pri-
vacy interests. Even this information, however, has been challenged
by privacy advocates who argue that certain information could be
used to target certain doctors or place them in harm's way.31 So long
as privacy safeguards are in place, this information should be
disseminated.
c. Peer Review and Other Similar Information
Whether hospital peer review information should be available to
medical consumers to judge their doctors raises the fundamental ques-
tion whether peer review proceedings can ever serve as evidence of
malpractice. At present, most states protect the privacy of hospital
peer review proceedings,312 maintaining that such confidentiality is
crucial for effective peer review, and that, because peer review boards
308. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989) ("Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records
that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and
local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a
single clearinghouse of information."); see also Beall, supra note 238, at 1256 (discuss-
ing Reporters Committee and the proposition that the public availability of one's crim-
inal past through some sources does not justify its inclusion in a government data
bank); Goldstein, supra note 229, at 1213 ("[T]he mere fact that a record has been
public historically does not justify continued treatment without first examining the
reasons behind the original policy.").
309. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
310. AMA Physician Select, (visited Dec. 12, 1997), <http://www.ama-assn.org>; see
also Your Health: Checking up on Your Doctor: What Can You Find Out?, Consumer
Rep., Nov. 1996, at 62 (discussing alternative sources for this information); Stephanie
Wood, Checking up on Your Doctor, American Health For Women, March 1997, at
62, 102 (same).
311. See, e.g., Angela C. Couch, Note, Wanted: Privacy Protection for Doctors Who
Perform Abortions, 4 Am. U.J. Gender & L. 361 (1996) (arguing that publishing cer-
tain information may identify doctors who perform abortions and thus endanger
them); Mohl, supra note 55, at Al (reporting the Massachusetts Legislature's fears
that the online data bank could be used by terrorists to target doctors).
312. Jonathon P. Tomes, Healthcare Privacy & Confidentiality 159-60 (1994). In
addition, many states have enacted laws to preserve the confidentiality of health care
proceedings. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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are not courts of law, to publish such information as evidence of negli-
gence would violate physicians' due process rights.31 3 This traditional
treatment of peer review information recognizes the importance of
confidentiality in ensuring the integrity of the peer review process. 14
Therefore, such information should remain confidential and inaccessi-
ble to the general public through a physician data bank.
d. Medical Illnesses and Substance Abuse Problems
Although, if asked, most Americans would say that they would pre-
fer to know if their physician has a medical illness or substance abuse
problem,315 the question of whether this information should be dis-
closed has traditionally been subject to great dispute.31 6 Although
nondisclosure of this information has greater potential to harm pa-
tients, information about medical illnesses and substance abuse
problems is also arguably more personal and more deserving of pri-
vacy protection.3 17 Records of medical illnesses or substance abuse
problems are personal information for which traditionally there has
been a higher degree of privacy protection.318 Such information is
313. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 3, 110 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., McIntosh, supra note 82, at 317 (discussing how a hypothetical pa-
tient would want to know if his surgeon is HIV-positive).
316. See generally Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Restricting Medical
Licenses Based on Illness Is Wrong-Reporting Makes It Worse, 9 J.L & Health 273
(1994-95) (discussing the debate over restricting the licenses or privileges of physi-
cians with illnesses and whether information about illness-based practice restrictions
should be reported and to whom).
317. Id. at 289 ("The threat to confidentiality posed by national data banks in-
creases the potential infringement of the doctor's right to privacy."). Courts, in exam-
ining this limited privacy right, have weighed it against the risk of bodily harm to the
patient. Id. at 288-89.
318. This is a traditionally "sensitive" category according to fair information prac-
tices. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
An example of the privacy interests at stake with personal information is the debate
over whether patients should be apprised of their physician's HIV status. Although
most states have statutes to protect HIV positive patients from having hospitals and
doctors disclose their HIV status, this privacy right is somewhat weakened when the
patient is a physician. See, e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592
A.2d 1251, 1274, 1283 (NJ. 1991) (finding that, as a patient, plaintiff-physician had a
right not to have his HIV status disclosed by the hospital and its staff; but that, as a
doctor, he did not have a right to keep such information from potential surgical pa-
tients); In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. of the Pa. State Univ., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa.
1991) (allowing disclosure of physician's HIV status to patients despite the confidenti-
ality provisions of the Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act). Most courts,
while acknowledging physicians' privacy rights in keeping their HIV status confiden-
tial, have nonetheless mandated disclosure on the grounds that such secrecy endan-
gers patients. See, eg., Fay v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) (holding that, as
a matter of law, surgeons have a duty to warn patients of an HIV infected condition);
Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283 (same). Most of these decisions, however, are limited to
where the plaintiff actually was or had reason to believe he was in physical danger of
contracting HIV. Brozoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1367 (Del. 1995); Fay, 620 A.2d
at 337. For a patient to be in actual danger, the patient must have undergone or be
prepared to undergo treatment by the allegedly dangerous physician. Therefore,
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generally protected, and this protection does not completely disappear
simply because the subject is a physician.319 In addition, to a limited
extent, federal law protects against dissemination of this informa-
tion.320 These are the types of situations in which peer review, as op-
posed to the public dissemination of information, is most effective. It
is preferable to strengthen peer review and consequently encourage
physicians to monitor and seek help for one another rather than allow
the public access to information that physicians, seeking to preserve
their and their profession's reputation, ultimately may cease to report
to peer review boards.321 Information about physicians' substance ad-
dictions or medical illnesses is not currently contained in the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Even if such information were to be col-
lected for peer review purposes, it would be harmful to peer review to
disseminate this information.
e. Malpractice Settlements
In most situations malpractice settlement payments should not be
included in the information to which the public has access because to
do so violates the fair information practices goal of ensuring that only
relevant and useful information is disseminated.322 Although medical
consumers desire access to a physician's history of malpractice pay-
ments as a means of identifying negligent doctors,323 it is unclear
these cases are limited to doctor-patient relationships and do not require the physi-
cian to make his HIV status known to the entire community of potential patients as
inclusion in a public data bank would do.
319. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1274 (finding that, even with regard to physicians, hos-
pital has a duty to keep HIV status confidential).
320. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). "[E]ven if
courts continue to reject privacy claims, illness-based restrictions cannot survive chal-
lenges under the ADA." Coleman & Shellow, supra note 316, at 289. See also Gostin,
supra note 121, at 14 (discussing how "[flederal law creates strict rules for maintaining
the confidentiality of records of patients treated for drug or alcohol dependency at
facilities receiving federal assistance" and how government hospitals or private hospi-
tals maintaining records under government contracts are subject to the provisions of
the Privacy Act); Schwartz, supra note 125, at 318.
321. Although state and federal statutes such as the HCQIA require that third par-
ties such as peer review committees report actions regarding negligent physicians, the
statutes do not mandate that individual physicians report their colleagues to the third-
party reporters. While the goal of these statutes is to strengthen peer review, if physi-
cians are fearful of the consequences of self-reporting and monitoring their negligent
colleagues, they will not voluntarily engage in the peer review process and such third
parties will have less information to report. See supra notes 101-105 and accompany-
ing text.
322. See supra Part III.B.2.a. Settlement payments are different from malpractice
payments made to satisfy a court judgment. Court judgments are public records and
subject to a different standard of privacy protection. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.
323. In supporting legislation to open the National Practitioner Data Bank, Rep.
Scott Kug (R-Wis.) said that, "Opening the data bank [would] protect the 'vast ma-
jority of physicians who do a good job' by exposing the bad apples .... ." House Bill
Would Open Practitioner Data Bank, Med. & Health, April 25, 1994, available in 1994
WL 2618172.
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whether all malpractice payments are a useful indicator of incompe-
tence.324 For example, section 427(d) of the HCQUIA specifically
states that "a payment in settlement of a medical malpractice action or
claim shall not be construed as creating a presumption that medical
malpractice has occurred." 3" Malpractice information was originally
included in the Data Bank merely to alert hospital review boards of a
potential problem, not to serve as evidence of malpractice.3 26 This
wording was included in the Act in recognition of the fact that many
physicians prefer to settle "nuisance" suits, rather than waste their
time and money taking these frivolous suits to court.
327
That more than three-fourths of the reports in the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank are malpractice payment reports32 suggests that
consumers would be primarily relying on malpractice payments to
judge a doctor's competence. Even when the information in the data
bank indicates an actual instance of malpractice, however, that infor-
mation is not necessarily helpful because it may not actually predict
whether that physician will commit malpractice again.3 9 According
to AMA Trustee Thomas Reardon, M.D., the information is mislead-
324. See infra notes 327-37 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of physi-
cian malpractice payments to consistently identify incompetent physicians).
325. Pub. L. No. 99-660, Title IV, § 427(d), 100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 11115(d) (1986)).
326. 45 C.F.R. § 60.7(b)(3) (viii) (1996); see Todd, supra note 96, at 377 (quoting
from the National Practitioner Data Bank Guidebook (Public Health Service 1994)).
Although insurance companies use much of the same information to calculate risk,
peer review boards, as required by law, use the National Practitioner Data Bank to
obtain information useful for making staff privileges and disciplinary decisions. While
insurance companies may use malpractice information to predict future claims, for
peer review boards, malpractice payments are not evidence of negligence per se, but
merely one factor used to access a physician's competence. See infra notes 327-37 and
accompanying text (explaining the difference between using past malpractice history
to calculate risk of future suits and the inability of the same information to predict
actual incompetence).
327. Margolis, supra note 41, at 25 ("It is well known in the medical profession that
many malpractice settlements are tiny payments given to ward off nuisance lawsuits
by litigious patients who were probably not victims of true malpractice."). A 1990
Harvard University study looked at negligent injuries in New York hospitals and how
often those injuries resulted in lawsuits. The study found that only one out of eight
patients who were victims of negligent medical injuries actually filed a lawsuit; while
at the same time, of those malpractice claims that were filed, less than twenty percent
were actually justified. Kong, supra note 28, at 25 (reporting on the study). Attempt-
ing to prevent the perception of these frivolous nuisance suits as evidence of physician
incompetence, the AMA recommends that only malpractice payments over $30,000
be reported. AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.993(6), 355.999(1) (1996). Presumably,
damages of more than $30,000 indicate legitimate claims, while smaller damages
under $30,000 are more likely to result from nuisance suits that physicians prefer to
pay off rather than argue on the merits.
328. At the end of 1994, 82.6 percent of all reports in the National Practitioner
Data Bank were malpractice payment reports. Robert E. Oshel et al., The National
Practitioner Data Bank. The First For Years, Pub. Health Rep., July 1, 1995, at 383.
329. See Ryzen, supra note 76, at 429 (discussing whether and how often malprac-
tice claims actually reflect physician incompetence).
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ing because, "[v]ery, very good physicians are sued and good physi-
cians who take difficult cases have bad outcomes .... ,,330 Numerous
studies have debated the predictability of future medical negligence
based on past incidents of malpractice.
For example, Elizabeth Ryzen, in her article, The National Practi-
tioner Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 331 cites several
studies on the predictive value of past malpractice claims. First, she
cites a study by the Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company and
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners that found the
major factor influencing the amount of malpractice litigation in which
a physician was involved was not the physician's competency, but the
complexity of the illness.332 If complexity of the illness influences the
amount of malpractice litigation to which a physician is subject, one
potential negative result is that physicians will avoid taking patients
where the chance of medical "success" is lower.333
Doctors and physician advocates claim that numerous reasons,
apart from incompetence, cause some doctors to get sued more than
others. For example, in the Nov. 9, 1994 Journal of the American
Medical Association (JAMA), a study of 8247 Florida doctors con-
cluded that a doctor with even one claim against him was more than
two times as likely to be sued again. 4 In the same JAMA issue, how-
ever, two Vanderbilt University studies on Florida obstetricians found
no difference in the quality of care exhibited by the doctors who had
previously been sued for malpractice and those who had not.335 Such
findings indicate that other factors-such as poor bedside manner or
poor communication skills-may account for repeated lawsuits.336
Therefore, while there may be some correlation between past rates of
malpractice claims and future claims, a past malpractice claim rate
does not necessarily correlate with future acts of negligence.
These and other studies have also indicated, however, that there
might be some correlation to actual incompetence where the malprac-
tice damage awards are excessively large or where a single physician
has an unusually high number of claims, taking into account the physi-
cian's specialty and years of practice.337 For this reason, some organi-
zations, such as the AMA, advocate disclosure of medical malpractice
information that is limited to a certain number of claims or payments
330. Bill Would Open Practitioner Data Bank, Med. Utilization Mgmt., April 28,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2618551.
331. Ryzen, supra note 76, at 409.
332. Id. at 430.
333. See Castrone, supra note 21, at 3D.
334. Kong, supra note 28, at 25.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Ryzen supra note 76, at 432-33.
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above a threshold amount.33 One would hope that by strengthening
peer review, physicians who commit egregious or overly numerous
acts of malpractice (as represented by a large number of claims or an
unusually high payment) would be prohibited from-or at least lim-
ited in-practicing medicine. Without proof of such an effectively-
functioning peer review system, medical consumers should be allowed
to protect themselves by selfscreening for such incompetent physi-
cians. Therefore, most malpractice settlement payments are not help-
ful indicators of malpractice and should not be disclosed, a physician
with more than a pre-set number of malpractice claims within a pre-
set number of years,3 39 or with a settlement payment over $30,000,
should be so identified in the Data Bank.1 0
Public depositories that contain medical malpractice settlements
create the risk that the public may perceive a settlement payment as
evidence of incompetence when, in fact, the number of settlement
payments a physician has made may merely indicate how long he has
been practicing medicine.34' Also, publicizing all physician malprac-
tice settlements will unduly prejudice practitioners in certain special-
ties with higher rates of medical malpractice lawsuits, -2 such as
surgeons' 3 or obstetricians.' Therefore, if malpractice information
is to be disseminated, it should be accompanied by information to rel-
ativize the data and present it in the proper context. For example, a
report on a physician's malpractice payment could be accompanied by
the rates of malpractice payments made by physicians practicing in the
same location, for the same amount of time, and in the same specialty
so that the information recipient would have some basis for judging
the information.
When such information is released but does not fill a legitimate
public concern, the physician's privacy interest becomes paramount in
the privacy balancing test. Thus, by disseminating only limited infor-
mation in a manner consistent with fair information practices, the
338. AMA Pol'y Compendium 355.998 (1996). But see Randall R. Bovbjerb and
Kenneth R. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physicians' Malpractice Claims His-
tory and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict the Futre? JAMA, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1421
(concluding that claims history of all kinds is a reasonable statistical measure, but that
certain types of physician claims are better predictors than others).
339. Because rates of malpractice vary by specialty and years of practice, Margolis,
supra note 41, at 25, the pre-set amount should be set by a determination of what is
egregious based on the standards of the specialty.
340. See supra note 327 (discussing the rationale for a S30,000 threshold).
341. If a typical physician has a thirty-eight percent chance of being sued, see Mar-
golis, supra note 41, at 25, arguably, the risk will increase with each year the physician
practices.
342. Johnson, supra note 7, at 408.
343. Surgeons have an over fifty percent chance of being sued. Margolis, supra
note 41, at 25.
344. Obstetricians/gynecologists "can expect to be sued at least three times during
[their] career." Id. (quoting Rep. Larry Combest (R-Tex.), an opponent of opening
the National Practitioner Data Bank to the public).
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model National Practitioner Data Bank would be able to disseminate
the information that meets the public goal of obtaining the informa-
tion necessary to make informed decisions about their health care and
protect the information that must remain confidential to ensure physi-
cians' privacy interests and, consequently, their faith in the National
Practitioner Data Bank and the peer review process.
CONCLUSION
Although it is clear that it is in the best interests of medical consum-
ers to have access to information about their physicians in a conve-
nient forum, it is equally clear that physicians have a privacy interest
in some information sufficient to afford them certain protections in
the manner in which this information is disseminated and used. If the
public's desire for this information is granted without simultaneously
respecting physicians' privacy concerns, physicians will adjust their be-
havior to protect their privacy interests. As a result, peer review may
be compromised, physicians will spend more of their time defending
their reputations in lawsuits, and physicians will be less likely to take
the more difficult cases for fear of the publicity repercussions should
anything go wrong. The end result will be an overall decline in the
quality of health care. Limited public access to the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank, with the medical profession playing a part in decid-
ing what information meets patients' informational needs and health
care concerns, provides the public needed information without unduly
compromising physician privacy or, ultimately, the overall quality of
health care.
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